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How Much Is Too Much? 
A Test to Protect Against Excessive Fines 
DANIEL S. HARAWA* 
Fines are the most common form of punishment in the United States and 
are disparately imposed against poor people of color. The stories of 
fines ruining lives abound. Yet until last year, in most state courts, it 
was not clear whether a person could challenge financial punishment 
imposed against them as unconstitutional. That changed when the 
Supreme Court held in Timbs v. Indiana that the Eighth Amendment’s 
Excessive Fines Clause applies to the states. 
 
Despite the fact that all state and federal courts must now be equipped 
to decide whether financial punishment violates the Eighth Amendment, 
the Supreme Court has not provided a concrete test for deciding 
whether a fine is constitutionally excessive. It has only said that a fine 
is excessive if it is “grossly disproportional” to the gravity of the 
offense.  
 
This Article provides the guidance lacking in the Court’s case law by 
supplementing the “grossly disproportional” test. After examining the 
Court’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, it offers four 
factors for courts to consider when deciding whether a fine is excessive: 
(1) whether the defendant is able to pay the fine; (2) whether fines are 
a significant revenue source in the sentencing jurisdiction; (3) whether 
other jurisdictions impose similar fines for similar crimes; and (4) 
whether the sentencing jurisdiction disproportionately imposes fines 
against minority defendants.  
 
As many courts decide for the first time whether fines are excessive, this 
Article serves as a roadmap to help guide the analysis. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Harriet Cleveland, a grandmother from Missouri, was unable to pay her 
traffic tickets; she was arrested for nonpayment while at home feeding her 
grandson and spent ten days in jail.1 Megan Sharp, a mother of three from Ohio, 
was fined hundreds of dollars for driving with a suspended license; when she 
could not make her monthly payments, she was forced to leave her home and to 
move in with family members.2 Damian Stinnie, a twenty-four-year-old from 
                                                                                                                     
 1 Joe Otterson, John Oliver Reveals How Traffic Tickets Can Ruin People’s Lives, 
WRAP (Mar. 23, 2015), https://www.thewrap.com/john-oliver-explains-out-how-traffic-
tickets-can-ruin-peoples-lives-video/ [https://perma.cc/TEA3-NML4] (including a link to a 
video of John Oliver’s segment on the devastating effects of fines).  
 2 AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF OHIO, THE OUTSKIRTS OF HOPE: HOW OHIO’S 
DEBTORS’ PRISONS ARE RUINING LIVES AND COSTING COMMUNITIES 15 (Apr. 2013), 
http://www.acluohio.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/TheOutskirtsOfHope2013_04.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8ZED-DKG2]. 
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Virginia recently diagnosed with lymphoma, owed $1000 in traffic fines; his 
debt forced him into homelessness.3  
Fines are the most common form of punishment levied in the United States.4 
Make no mistake, fines ruin lives. They can create a perpetual cycle of poverty. 
What starts as a citation for a minor offense can end in jail time,5 missed medical 
treatments,6 joblessness,7 and even homelessness.8 Up until February 2019, in 
most state courts, it was not even clear whether a person could challenge a fine 
as unconstitutional, no matter how disastrous its effect. That changed when the 
Supreme Court held in Timbs v. Indiana that states, by virtue of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, are bound by the Eighth Amendment’s 
Excessive Fines Clause,9 which plainly proclaims excessive fines shall not be 
imposed.10  
In the 1998 case, United States v. Bajakajian, the Supreme Court for the 
first time announced a test for deciding whether a fine is excessive in violation 
of the Eighth Amendment: if a fine is “grossly disproportional to the gravity of 
the defendant’s offense,” it violates the Eighth Amendment.11 It is far from clear 
what it means for a fine to be “grossly disproportional” to an offense, and the 
Supreme Court has not provided any further guidance.12  
                                                                                                                     
 3 Justin Wm. Moyer, Lawsuit on Va. License Suspension Is Revived, HOUS. CHRON. 
(May 24, 2018), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/article/Lawsuit-on-Va-license 
-suspension-is-revived-12941768.php [https://perma.cc/L8W9-TGUR]. 
 4 Karin D. Martin et al., Monetary Sanctions: Legal Financial Obligations in US 
Systems of Justice, 1 ANN. REV. CRIMINOLOGY 471, 472 (2018). 
 5 See Jessica Brand, How Fines and Fees Criminalize Poverty: Explained, APPEAL 
(July 16, 2018), https://theappeal.org/fines-and-fees-explained-bf4e05d188bf/ [https:// 
perma.cc/YU89-W5VU]. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id.  
 8 Editorial, States Across the Nation Are Criminalizing Poverty, WASH. POST (May 27, 
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/states-across-the-nation-are-criminal 
izing-poverty/2018/05/27/4637b048-5df6-11e8-a4a4-c070ef53f315_story.html?noredir 
ect=on&utm_term=.5fc8e1ade86d [on file with Ohio State Law Journal]. 
 9 Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 686–87 (2019). Some Justices have suggested that 
it is the Privileges or Immunities Clause that incorporates the Bill of Rights against the states. 
See id. at 691 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (opining that the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
may be the appropriate clause for incorporation); id. at 691 (Thomas, J., concurring) (opining 
that the Privileges or Immunities Clause incorporates the Excessive Fines Clause). 
 10 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 11 United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998). 
 12 See, e.g., Collins v. SEC, 736 F.3d 521, 527 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (lamenting the fact that 
“Bajakajian hardly establish[ed] a discrete analytic process”); David Pimentel, Forfeitures 
and the Eighth Amendment: A Practical Approach to the Excessive Fines Clause as a Check 
on Government Seizures, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 541, 543 (2017) (explaining that the 
Bajakajian “standard has not proven to be a very useful guide for lower courts”); Matthew 
C. Solomon, The Perils of Minimalism: United States v. Bajakajian in the Wake of the 
Supreme Court’s Civil Double Jeopardy Excursion, 87 GEO. L.J. 849, 884 (1999) (noting 
that Bajakajian “provides only limited guidance to future parties and the lower courts about 
the scope and applicability of the Excessive Fines Clause”). 
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Given the lack of concrete guidance from the Supreme Court, federal courts 
have been preoccupied with defining gross disproportionality, divining their 
own Excessive Fines Clause tests by extrapolating from Bajakajian.13 As a 
result, there is no uniform measure for deciding whether financial punishment 
violates the Eighth Amendment.  
The need for guidance in this area is more important now than it has ever 
been before—Timbs made the question of what constitutes an “excessive fine” 
constitutionally relevant in all fifty states.14 State courts need to know how to 
determine the constitutionality of financial punishment because now, in every 
state across the country, defendants can challenge fines imposed against them 
as violating the Constitution.15 
Exacerbating the need for guidance is the fact that today, fines are the most 
common form of punishment.16 And there are reasons to be skeptical about 
whether fines are being constitutionally meted out, given that a number of state 
and local governments rely on fines to satisfy budgetary needs.17 Given the fact 
that jurisdictions are using financial punishment as a way to fund government, 
there is a real incentive to over-police and over-punish minor crimes.18  
Not only that, jurisdictions across the country are disproportionality 
assessing fines against poor people of color.19 The United States Commission 
                                                                                                                     
 13 See, e.g., Nicholas M. McLean, Livelihood, Ability to Pay, and the Original Meaning 
of the Excessive Fines Clause, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 833, 845–46 (2013) (“[E]ach 
circuit has had to develop its own version of the Bajakajian . . . multi-factor ‘gross 
disproportionality’ test, with the ‘gross disproportionality’ determination often characterized 
as an inherently fact-intensive inquiry.”).  
 14 See Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 686–87. 
 15 See id. 
 16 See Martin et al., supra note 4, at 472 (noting that “[m]onetary sanctions are the most 
common form of punishment imposed by criminal justice systems across the United States”).  
 17 See Beth A. Colgan, Lessons from Ferguson on Individual Defense Representation 
as a Tool of Systemic Reform, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1171, 1174–75 (2017) [hereinafter 
Colgan, Lessons from Ferguson]; DICK M. CARPENTER II ET AL., INST. FOR JUSTICE, 
POLICING FOR PROFIT: THE ABUSE OF CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE 2 (2d ed. Nov. 2015), 
http://ij.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/policing-for-profit-2nd-edition.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/E4RA-YFUE].  
 18 See generally Developments in the Law—Policing, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1706, 1723 
(2015) (arguing that fees are a source of oppression for the poor); CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY 
PROGRAM, HARVARD LAW SCH., CONFRONTING CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A GUIDE FOR 
POLICY REFORM 1 (Sept. 2016), http://cjpp.law.harvard.edu/assets/Confronting-Crim-
Justice-Debt-Guide-to-Policy-Reform-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/XN2Q-CEZJ] 
[hereinafter CONFRONTING CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT] (“In many jurisdictions, court costs and 
surcharges fund the agencies responsible for imposing fees and fines on individuals.”).  
 19 U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TARGETED FINES AND FEES AGAINST COMMUNITIES 
OF COLOR: CIVIL RIGHTS & CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 3 (Sept. 2017), https:// 
www.usccr.gov/pubs/2017/Statutory_Enforcement_Report2017.pdf  [https://perma 
.cc/GDC7-FXWU] (“Municipalities that rely heavily on revenue from fines and fees have 
a higher than average percentage of African American and Latino populations relative to the 
demographics of the median municipality.”) [hereinafter TARGETED FINES AND FEES 
AGAINST COMMUNITIES OF COLOR]; REBECCA VALLAS ET AL., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, 
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on Civil Rights found that the one demographic most common among the 
jurisdictions that frequently impose fines was a large African American 
population.20 This phenomenon is the outgrowth of other well-documented 
racial disparities in the criminal legal system, including racial disparities in who 
is stopped, arrested, prosecuted, and found guilty.21 The disparate punishment 
of minorities raises more constitutional concerns about how fines are imposed 
today. 
In the face of evidence that fines are being overused and abused, this Article 
provides guidance that has so far been lacking. The Article puts some much 
needed meat on the Supreme Court’s barebones “grossly disproportional” test, 
and implores courts to consider, in addition to the gravity of the offense, the 
following four factors when deciding whether a fine is constitutionally 
excessive:  
1. Whether the defendant is able pay the fine. 
2. Whether fines are a significant revenue source in the sentencing 
jurisdiction. 
3. Whether other jurisdictions impose similar fines for similar crimes.  
4. Whether the sentencing jurisdiction disproportionately imposes fines 
against minority defendants.22 
As the Article explains, these four factors guard against arbitrary and 
discriminatory sentencing. The factors ensure fines are meted out in furtherance 
of a legitimate penal purpose, not just to raise revenue. And while the four-factor 
test is novel, each factor fits squarely within existing Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendment jurisprudence and is consistent with the Amendments’ purposes. 
The Article unfolds in three parts. First, it briefly lays out the modern-day 
realities of financial punishment. Second, it examines the Supreme Court’s 
Excessive Fines Clause jurisprudence, including its decisions in Bajakajian and 
Timbs, and then discusses how lower courts have grappled with the Court’s 
Excessive Fines Clause case law. And finally, the Article lays out the four 
factors and shows how they should be applied.  
                                                                                                                     
FORFEITING THE AMERICAN DREAM: HOW CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE EXACERBATES 
HARDSHIP FOR LOW-INCOME COMMUNITIES AND COMMUNITIES OF COLOR 5–8 (Apr. 2016), 
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/31133144/032916_Civil 
AssetForfeiture-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4HZY-TTAT] (detailing a number of 
jurisdictions that have marked racial disparities in terms of how forfeiture is used). 
 20 See TARGETED FINES AND FEES AGAINST COMMUNITIES OF COLOR, supra note 19, at 
23. 
 21 See, e.g., CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE 
FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 4–5 (Mar. 2015), http://www.justice.gov/crt/ 
about/spl/documents/ferguson_findings_3-4-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/5PKU-XNE5] 
[hereinafter FERGUSON REPORT] (explaining the racial disparities in the imposition of fines 
in Ferguson, Missouri). 
 22 The test uses the word “fine” to track the language of the Eighth Amendment. As 
explained later, see infra Part III.A, criminal forfeitures are also a “fine” for Eighth 
Amendment purposes; they are therefore included within the test.  
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At bottom, the Article argues that courts should consider all four factors 
when deciding whether a defendant’s financial punishment is constitutional, no 
matter how trivial the fine may seem at first blush. Whether it be a fifty dollar 
fine or one million dollar forfeiture, the same multi-faceted analysis should 
occur. Because, as the stories in the beginning show, what starts off as a “small” 
fine for a “minor” crime can, without exaggeration, devastate a person’s life. 
II. THE MODERN-DAY REALITIES OF FINES AND FORFEITURES 
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution forbids three 
things: “excessive bail,” “excessive fines,” and “cruel and unusual 
punishments.”23 The Supreme Court decided that the “cruel and unusual 
punishments” clause of the Eighth Amendment applies to the states by way of 
the Fourteenth Amendment over fifty years ago.24 Since then, especially in the 
death penalty context, the Court has frequently opined on whether certain 
punishments are “cruel and unusual” in violation of the Constitution.25  
This past Term, the Supreme Court ruled in Timbs v. Indiana that the Eighth 
Amendment’s “excessive fines” clause also applies to the states.26 This means 
that a “fine” levied by the state is subject to certain constitutional parameters—
it cannot be “excessive.”27 Before discussing the present lay of the land, it is 
important to understand what is, what may be, and what is not, covered by the 
Excessive Fines Clause. First, to fall within the ambit of the Eighth Amendment, 
any sum of money that a defendant is ordered to pay must be ordered as a form 
of punishment payable to the government.28 This covers fines as they are 
generally understood, i.e., a person violates the law and then they are fined a 
certain dollar amount as punishment. But it also covers criminal forfeitures, i.e., 
“[a] governmental proceeding brought against a person to seize property as 
punishment for the person’s criminal behavior.”29 And forfeitures can happen 
as a part of a defendant’s criminal proceedings, meaning the government takes 
property while charges are pending or after a conviction,30 or they can be civil, 
where the government initiates separate proceedings and proves that the 
                                                                                                                     
 23 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 24 See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962). In dicta, the Supreme Court 
said that the Excessive Bail Clause is also incorporated against the states. See Schilb v. 
Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971).  
 25 See, e.g., Madison v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 718, 722–23 (2019); Bucklew v. Precythe, 
139 S. Ct. 1112, 1117 (2019); Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2727 (2015).  
 26 Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 687 (2019).  
 27 See id. 
 28 See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 609–10 (1993). 
 29 Criminal Forfeiture, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 30 See, e.g., United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998). 
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property was used to facilitate a crime.31 In both instances, the Excessive Fines 
Clause applies.32 
But there is much criminal justice debt people face that the Supreme Court 
has not decided one way or another whether it would be covered by the 
Excessive Fines Clause. This unaccounted for money that defendants are often 
ordered to pay includes court costs and fees associated with complying with 
punishment.33 For example, the cost to rent an ankle monitor, the price of court-
required drug testing, or supervision fees paid to private probation companies.34 
These costs can run thousands of dollars.35 The answer to whether these costs 
would be covered by the Excessive Fines Clause is murky, because it turns on 
whether they are considered solely remedial, i.e., only designed to recoup costs, 
in which case they would not be covered, or whether they are partly punitive, in 
which case they would be covered.36 
Although the law in this area is far from comprehensive, the Supreme Court 
has left no doubt that criminal fines and forfeitures are covered by the Excessive 
Fines Clause.37 And courts’ ability to determine whether fines and forfeitures 
are constitutionally excessive is exceedingly important given that, over the past 
few decades, jurisdictions across the country have increasingly used fines and 
forfeitures as punishment.38 Governments, looking for ways to fund their 
                                                                                                                     
 31 See, e.g., Austin, 509 U.S. at 602. 
 32 See id. at 609. At least one federal court of appeals has held that mandatory restitution 
orders are covered by the Excessive Fines Clause. See United States v. Dubose, 146 F.3d 
1141, 1144 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that mandatory restitution imposed under the Mandatory 
Victims Restitution Act is covered under the Eighth Amendment). Restitution is defined as 
“full or partial compensation paid by a criminal to a victim . . . ordered as part of a criminal 
sentence.” Restitution, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 33 See Ray v. Judicial Corr. Servs., Inc., 270 F. Supp. 3d 1262, 1310 (N.D. Ala. 2017). 
 34 See, e.g., id. For example, one district court has held that probation fees are not 
covered. See id. On the other hand, a few state courts have held that similar types of costs 
are sufficiently punitive to bring them within the ambit of the Eighth Amendment. See 
Colgan, Lessons from Ferguson, supra note 17, at 1196 n.120 (collecting cases from Illinois, 
Louisiana, and Missouri and holding that various fees related to criminal prosecution fall 
within the ambit of the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause). 
 35 See Brand, supra note 5. 
 36 Some circuits have multi-factor tests to determine whether criminal justice costs are 
at least partly punitive and therefore covered by the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., United 
States v. Mayberry, 774 F.2d 1018, 1021 (10th Cir. 1985) (considering whether a cost 
“places an additional burden or penalty upon the defendant”; whether it “can be imposed 
only following conviction of a crime or offense”; and whether it “imposes a higher 
assessment on those persons convicted of felonies than on those convicted of 
misdemeanors”); accord United States v. King, 824 F.2d 313, 316–17 (4th Cir. 1987); United 
States v. Smith, 818 F.2d 687, 689–90 (9th Cir. 1987).  
 37 Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 687 (2019). 
 38 See Beth A. Colgan, Fines, Fees, and Forfeitures, 18 CRIMINOLOGY, CRIM. JUST. L. 
& SOC’Y 22, 22 (2017) (“The use of fines, fees, and forfeitures of cash and property are long-
standing practices that have boomed in recent years as lawmakers have sought to fund an 
expanding criminal justice system without raising taxes.” (internal citations omitted)); Kevin 
R. Reitz, The Economic Rehabilitation of Offenders: Recommendations of the Model Penal 
72 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 81:1 
expanding justice systems and to make up for budgetary shortfalls, have turned 
to fines and forfeitures as a significant revenue source.39 Indeed, a 2019 report 
found that revenue from fines and forfeitures “account for more than 10 percent 
of general fund revenue in nearly 600 U.S. jurisdictions,” and these jurisdictions 
are spread across at least thirty states.40 Given this reality, courts must be 
equipped to ensure fines and forfeitures comport with the Constitution.41 
A. The Ubiquity of Financial Punishment 
While much of the recent scholarly dialogue surrounding the criminal legal 
system has focused on mass incarceration,42 a 2015 report issued by the United 
States Department of Justice (DOJ) in the wake of the tragic killing of Michael 
Brown, an unarmed Black teenager in Ferguson, Missouri, exposed the ways in 
which financial punishment is being used and abused all over America.43 The 
Ferguson Report ignited a critical conversation about the perverse relationship 
between punishment and profit.44 
                                                                                                                     
Code (Second), 99 MINN. L. REV. 1735, 1737 (2015) (“Since the Model Penal Code (First) 
was approved in 1962, there has been steady growth in fine amounts, asset forfeitures, and a 
congeries of costs, fees, and assessments levied against criminal offenders.”).  
 39 See Mike Maciag, Addicted to Fines, GOVERNING (Sept. 2019), 
https://www.governing.com/topics/finance/gov-addicted-to-fines.html [https://perma 
.cc/Y7BJ-24D8]. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Other issues relating to criminal justice debt that have received attention both in 
scholarship and litigation include state practices of jailing people for not paying criminal 
justice debt and state practices of making wealth-based pretrial detention decisions. See, e.g., 
Olivia C. Jerjian, The Debtors’ Prison Scheme: Yet Another Bar in the Birdcage of Mass 
Incarceration of Communities of Color, 41 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 235, 235 (2017); 
Cynthia E. Jones, Accused and Unconvicted: Fleeing from Wealth-Based Pretrial Detention, 
82 ALB. L. REV. 1063, 1064 (2018/2019). Challenges to these systems are often brought 
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and the Supreme Court’s line of 
cases holding that it is unconstitutional to jail someone for failure to pay if the failure is not 
willful. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 668–69 (1983).  
 42 See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE 
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 16 (rev. ed. 2012); PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: POLICING BLACK 
MEN 2–3 (2017); see also Shon Hopwood, The Effort to Reform the Federal Criminal Justice 
System, 128 YALE L.J. F. 791, 800 (2019) (noting that “[l]egal scholarship focused on mass 
incarceration and criminal justice reform exploded after . . . The New Jim Crow”); Benjamin 
Levin, The Consensus Myth in Criminal Justice Reform, 117 MICH. L. REV. 259, 261 (2018) 
(noting that “a growing body of legal scholarship [has] popularized ‘mass incarceration’”).  
 43 See FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 21, at 2. 
 44 See Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Gangsters of Ferguson, ATLANTIC (Mar. 5, 2015), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/03/The-Gangsters-Of-Ferguson/386893/ 
[https://perma.cc/KL3W-4VM4]. 
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As other scholars have recounted in greater depth,45 the Ferguson Report 
revealed how criminal fines and forfeitures were being abused in Ferguson.46 
The Report concluded that “Ferguson’s law enforcement practices [were] 
shaped on the City’s focus on revenue rather than by public safety needs.”47 The 
Report found that Ferguson was generating “a significant and increasing amount 
of revenue” from fines.48 For that reason, “[c]ity, police, and court officials for 
years ha[d] worked in concert to maximize revenue at every stage of the 
enforcement process.”49 
The Ferguson Report also concluded that the emphasis on revenue 
generation shaped the Ferguson Police Department’s approach to policing.50 It 
was revealed that “[p]atrol assignments and schedules [were] geared toward 
aggressive enforcement of Ferguson’s municipal code” with little thought given 
as to whether the “enforcement strategies promote[d] public safety or 
unnecessarily undermine[d] community trust and cooperation.”51 Because 
Ferguson’s municipal code governed almost every aspect of a person’s life, 
officers were easily able to find infractions to cite people for violating.52 And 
Ferguson’s Black residents bore the brunt of the city’s fining practices; while 
Ferguson is only sixty-seven percent African American, ninety percent of the 
citations issued by the Ferguson Police Department were to Black people.53 
But as then-Attorney General Eric Holder cautioned at the release of the 
Report, although the Report was focused on Ferguson, its findings were “not 
confined to any one city, state, or geographic region. They implicate[d] 
questions about fairness and trust that are national in scope.”54 Indeed, in 
September 2017, the United States Commission on Civil Rights released a 
follow up to the Ferguson Report, and found that although the data at the time 
was scant, at least thirty-eight cities including Ferguson “received 10 percent or 
                                                                                                                     
 45 For more in-depth discussions of the Ferguson Report, see, e.g., Torie Atkinson, A 
Fine Scheme: How Municipal Fines Become Crushing Debt in the Shadow of the New 
Debtors’ Prisons, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 189, 196–99, 201–05 (2016); Neil L. Sobol, 
Lessons Learned from Ferguson: Ending Abusive Collection of Criminal Justice Debt, 15 U. 
MD. L.J. RACE RELIGION GENDER & CLASS 293, 295–309 (2015).  
 46 FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 21, at 2. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. at 9. 
 49 Id. at 10. 
 50 Id. at 2. 
 51 Id.  
 52 FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 21, at 7 (“Ferguson’s municipal code addresses nearly 
every aspect of civic life for those who live in Ferguson, and regulates the conduct of all who 
work, travel through, or otherwise visit the City.”). 
 53 Id. at 64. 
 54 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Holder Delivers Update on 
Investigation in Ferguson, Missouri (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/ 
attorney-general-holder-delivers-update-investigations-ferguson-missouri [https://perma 
.cc/7QU9-JG27] [hereinafter Holder Press Release]. 
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more of [their] revenue from fines and fees.”55 And Ferguson was not unique in 
its targeting of African Americans, because, as the update to the Ferguson 
Report also found, the “one demographic that was most characteristic of cities 
that levy large amounts of fines on their citizens: a large African American 
population.”56 The update concluded that the “[u]nchecked discretion [and] 
stringent requirements to impose fines or fees can lead [and have led] to 
discrimination and inequitable access to justice.”57 
The Ferguson Report started a national conversation on how financial 
punishment is unfairly wielded, often against poor people of color, as a way to 
fund government.58 It exposed the underbelly of a justice system that at the time 
was not often discussed: it revealed that punishment went hand-in-hand with 
revenue generation, and detailed for the first time on the national stage how such 
a system can corrupt the administration of justice.59 The Ferguson Report 
caused people to contemplate how, and more importantly, why, financial 
punishment was being imposed in jurisdictions across the country.60 
Much has developed since DOJ released the Ferguson Report. As a start, 
much more information has been gathered about how and why jurisdictions 
impose financial punishment.61 And the picture is bleaker than that painted by 
the Ferguson Report and its update.62 A 2019 study found that fines “account 
for more than 10 percent of general fund revenues in nearly 600 jurisdictions.”63 
“In at least 284 of those governments,” fines account for “more than 20 percent” 
of general fund revenues.64 Some jurisdictions are almost exclusively funded by 
fines revenue; for example, 92 percent of Georgetown, Louisiana’s general fund 
is comprised of money made from fines.65 And “[w]hen fine and forfeiture 
revenues in all funds are considered, more than 720 localities reported annual 
revenues exceeding $100 for every adult resident.”66 
                                                                                                                     
 55 TARGETED FINES AND FEES AGAINST COMMUNITIES OF COLOR, supra note 19, at 21. 
 56 Id. at 23 (quoting Dan Kopf, The Fining of Black America, PRICEONOMICS (June 24, 
2016), https://priceonomics.com/the-fining-of-black-america/ [https://perma.cc/TV58-
AUGL]). 
 57 Id. at 71. 
 58 See, e.g., Matthew Menendez, Fines and Fees Justice Center Launches New 
Clearinghouse Featuring Brennan Center Work, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Jan. 8, 2019), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/fines-fees-justice-center-launches-new-clearinghouse-
featuring-brennan-center-work [https://perma.cc/YT2P-3WCX]. 
 59 Id. 
 60 See, e.g., id. (“Since the unrest in Ferguson, Missouri, in 2014, public awareness of 
the harms of fees and fines has grown substantially, along with an understanding of the large 
scope of the problem.”). 
 61 See Maciag, supra note 39. 
 62 See id. 
 63 See id. The report found some states are particularly bad offenders, including 
Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas, and New York. Id.  
 64 Id.  
 65 Id.  
 66 Id. 
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But with exposure has come progress. Since the release of the Ferguson 
Report, significant steps have been taken to mitigate the overuse and abuse of 
financial punishment.67 For example, in March 2016, DOJ issued a “Dear 
Colleague” letter to state administrators and chief justices of each state, 
emphasizing the need for courts to “safeguard against unconstitutional 
practices,” including the jailing of defendants for their inability to pay fines.68 
DOJ also helped establish a National Task Force on Fines, Fees, and Bail 
Practices, managed by the Conference of State Court Administrators and the 
Conference of Chief Justices.69 This task force drafted model statutes and 
compiled best practices for dealing with financial punishment,70 and has 
published a bench card to be used in local courtrooms that admonishes courts to 
consider a defendant’s economic circumstances before imposing a fine and 
gives guidance on how to calculate a defendant’s ability to pay.71 And 
lawmakers were prompted to action, including the Missouri legislature, which 
passed a bill that capped the amount of money cities like Ferguson can collect 
from fines.72 In short, while there is still much work to be done, there has been 
                                                                                                                     
 67 See, e.g., Letter from Vanita Gupta, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil 
Rights Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, & Lisa Foster, Dir., Office of Access to Justice, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div., to Colleagues (Mar. 14, 2016), https://finesandfees 
justicecenter.org/content/uploads/2018/11/Dear-Colleague-letter.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/F3PJ-XGTK] [hereinafter Dear Colleague Letter]. 
 68 See id. 
 69 See News Release, Lorri Montgomery, Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, Top National State 
Court Leadership Associations Launch National Task Force on Fines, Fees and Bail 
Practices (Feb. 3, 2016), https://www.ncsc.org/Newsroom/News-releases/2016/Task-
Force-on-Fines-Fees-and-Bail-Practices.aspx [https://perma.cc/3EUE-EP4Q]. 
 70 Id.; see also NAT’L TASK FORCE ON FINES, FEES, AND BAIL PRACTICES, PRINCIPLES 
ON FINES, FEES, AND BAIL PRACTICES 1 (Dec. 2017), https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/ 
Files/PDF/Topics/Fines%20and%20Fees/Principles-Fines-Fees.ashx [https://perma 
.cc/5UDG-HV2J].  
 71 See NAT’L TASK FORCE ON FINES, FEES, AND BAIL PRACTICES, LAWFUL COLLECTION 
OF LEGAL FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS: A BENCH CARD FOR JUDGES, https://www.ncsc.org 
/~/media/Files/PDF/Topics/Fines%20and%20Fees/format%20revisions/BenchCard%
20reformatted%203%2013%2019.ashx [https://perma.cc/46PB-BQH6]. A number of 
states and local jurisdictions have adopted bench cards for courts to use to assess a 
defendant’s ability to pay a fine. See, e.g., CITY OF BILOXI, BENCH CARD: BILOXI MUNICIPAL 
COURT PROCEDURES FOR LEGAL FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS & COMMUNITY SERVICE, 
https://biloxi.ms.us/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/BenchCard.pdf [https://perma.cc/SYL2-
HPXQ]; THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, COLLECTION OF COURT COSTS & FINES IN ADULT 
TRIAL COURTS, https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Publications/JCS/finesCourtCosts.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZLP7-N3VR]; TEXAS OFFICE OF COURT ADMIN., BENCH CARD FOR 
JUDICIAL PROCESSES RELATING TO THE COLLECTION OF FINES AND COSTS, 
http://www.txcourts.gov/media/1440393/sb-1913-justice-municipal.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B48N-U7H2]. 
 72 See S.B. 5, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2015) (enacted) (inserting 
§ 479.359); see also Jo Mannies & Donna Korando, Nixon Signs Bill Mandating Municipal 
Court Changes and Setting Standards, ST. LOUIS PUB. RADIO (July 9, 2015), 
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a real effort across the country to examine and change the ways in which 
financial punishment is imposed. 
B. The Consequences of Financial Punishment 
When people started examining how fines and forfeitures are being imposed 
in America, one thing became clear: fines and forfeitures can be incredibly 
damaging to a person’s life. Assessing a fine that a person cannot pay risks 
setting off a devastating chain of events. First, if a defendant is late paying a 
fine, there are often late fees or collections fees that are assessed, and that same 
person who could not make the payment in the first place may then be charged 
interest for every day their payment is late, compounding the problem by 
deepening the debt.73 Then, in some jurisdictions, courts will issue arrest 
warrants for failing to pay fines, and people can spend days, if not weeks, in 
jail,74 despite the fact that the Supreme Court has held that it is unconstitutional 
to imprison someone for failing to pay a fine if they are indigent.75 
While a person is in jail, they obviously cannot report to work, and they thus 
risk losing their job, which, again, would mean that they cannot pay their debt.76 
And after a person loses their job, that often means they can no longer pay the 
bills they need to pay to keep the water running, the electricity on, or a roof over 
their head,77 let alone pay the fine they owe.  
                                                                                                                     
https://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/nixon-signs-bill-mandating-municipal-court-changes-
and-setting-standards#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/L7EY-93XW]. 
 73 See Brand, supra note 5. 
 74 See, e.g., Kate Giammarise & Christopher Huffaker, Modern-Day Debtors’ Prisons? 
The System That Sends Pennsylvanians to Jail over Unpaid Court Costs and Fines, PITT. 
POST-GAZETTE (Feb. 16, 2018), https://newsinteractive.post-gazette.com/blog/modern-
day-debtors-prisons-lead-to-hundreds-jailed-each-year-in-pa-for-inability-to-pay-court 
-costs/ [https://perma.cc/89LC-NVFG]; Poor People in Alabama Continue to Be Jailed 
Because They Cannot Pay Fines, EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE (June 23, 2016), 
https://eji.org/news/alabamians-too-poor-to-pay-fines-are-jailed [https://perma.cc/75BK-
XNY2]; Sarah van Gelder, Yes, Lots of People Go to Jail Because They Can’t Pay a Fine, 
YES! MAG. (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.yesmagazine.org/peace-justice/yes-lots-of-people-
go-to-jail-because-they-cant-pay-a-fine-20180202 [https://perma.cc/JNK5-F9VX]; see also 
Martin et al., supra note 4, at 476. 
 75 The Supreme Court has held that “jailing an indigent for failing to make immediate 
payment of any fine” violates the Fourteenth Amendment. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 398 
(1971). The Court later extended this holding to rule that the Constitution similarly bars a 
state from revoking an indigent defendant’s probation for failure to pay a fine. See Bearden 
v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 661 (1983). After DOJ released the Ferguson Report, civil rights 
organizations began suing jurisdictions that jailed indigent people for failing to pay their 
criminal justice debt. See Joseph Shapiro, Lawsuits Target ‘Debtors’ Prisons’ Across the 
Country, NPR (Oct. 21, 2015), https://www.npr.org/2015/10/21/450546542/lawsuits-target-
debtors-prisons-across-the-country [https://perma.cc/86K5-DGPH]. 
 76 See, e.g., Brand, supra note 5. 
 77 Id.  
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But the devastating effects of fines go beyond the fact that people are locked 
up for not paying and the vicious cycle that then emerges. Beyond being jailed, 
there are additional collateral consequences that result from the failure to pay a 
fine that can send someone’s life into a tailspin.78 For example, at least nine 
states allow for driver’s licenses to be suspended for unpaid fines, hampering 
employment and childcare options.79 In thirty states, a person loses her right to 
vote for missing a payment related to a felony conviction, and in eight additional 
states, a person loses the right to vote for missing payments related to a 
misdemeanor conviction.80 And people are often reported to credit agencies for 
unpaid fines, hurting credit scores, which in turn can affect a person’s ability to 
secure housing, credit cards, cars, and jobs, and to the extent a person can secure 
credit, they are only able to do so at much higher interest rates, perpetuating the 
cycle of poverty.81 Wages can be garnished and liens placed on property for 
nonpayment.82 Some people even face the dilemma of having to forgo necessary 
medical treatment in order to pay their fines.83 
Forfeitures can be equally damaging. As with fines, state forfeiture practices 
also often “target the poor and other groups least able to defend their interests 
in forfeiture proceedings,” i.e., communities of color.84 This is why most 
forfeitures involve small dollar amounts from comparatively less culpable actors 
(for example, targeting drug users for forfeitures and not drug suppliers).85 And 
because forfeitures are so important to government funding, states are “edging 
ever closer to abusing forfeiture laws, confiscating individuals’ property with 
                                                                                                                     
 78 See Jerjian, supra note 41, at 252 (explaining that criminal justice debt “creates 
additional barriers . . . in terms of housing, employment, public benefits, and even civil 
rights”). 
 79 Martin et al., supra note 4, at 475.  
 80 Id.  
 81 Id.; VALLAS ET AL., supra note 19, at 6; see also State v. Blazina, 344 P.3d 680, 684 
(Wash. 2015) (explaining the collateral consequences of criminal justice debt).  
 82 Rebecca Vallas & Roopal Patel, Sentenced to a Life of Criminal Debt: A Barrier to 
Reentry and Climbing Out of Poverty, 46 J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 131, 133 n.26 (2012), 
https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Sentenced-to-a-Life-of-Criminal-
Debt.pdf [https://perma.cc/3TCN-DHTU] (noting a study that found at least fifteen states 
“permitted the use of civil collection methods to collect criminal debts, such as garnishment 
of wages, attachment of bank accounts, and liens on property”). 
 83 See, e.g., Lily Gleicher & Caitlin Delong, The Cost of Justice: The Impact of Criminal 
Justice Financial Obligations on Individuals and Families, ILL. CRIM. JUST. INFO. 
AUTHORITY (Aug. 1, 2018), https://icjia.illinois.gov/researchhub/articles/the-cost-of-
justice-the-impact-of-criminal-justice-financial-obligations-on-individuals-and-families 
[https://perma.cc/5KXW-8LDE]. 
 84 Leonard v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 847, 848 (2017) (Thomas, J., respecting the denial of 
certiorari). 
 85 See Radley Balko, Opinion, Chicago Civil Asset Forfeiture Hits Poor People the 
Hardest, WASH. POST (June 13, 2017), https://wapo.st/2PFgyvz [on file with Ohio State Law 
Journal]. The Alabama Supreme Court observed that “forfeiture laws are being used more 
frequently to punish users like [petitioner, who used drugs] rather than to punish those higher 
up the drug distribution chain.” Ex parte Kelley, 766 So. 2d 837, 839 (Ala. 1999). 
78 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 81:1 
no thought or proof of whether the items [they] are taking are actually the fruits 
of illegal[lity].”86 People are losing objects both big and small in the forfeiture 
process.87 For example, in a startling report out of Chicago, it was revealed that 
law enforcement “seized items from residents ranging from a cashier’s check 
for 34 cents to a 2010 Rolls Royce. They also seized Xbox controllers, 
televisions, nunchucks, 12 cans of peas, a pair of rhinestone cufflinks, and a 
bayonet.”88 In the forfeiture process, people can lose all of their worldly 
belongings, from their food, cash, cars, to even their homes.89 
This is why the Excessive Fines Clause must be taken seriously; because 
fines and forfeitures can dramatically affect people’s lives. And the issues with 
fines and forfeitures are not confined to a small segment of the population; they 
are imposed as a criminal sanction for all kinds of crimes, from the most minor 
infractions to the most serious felonies. Given this fact, along with the evidence 
that many jurisdictions impose fines and forfeitures against minorities at 
disparate rates,90 the question of whether a fine or forfeiture violates the Eighth 
Amendment should be one that is asked often and is contemplated carefully.  
This question becomes even more important when one considers the 
perverse incentives at play. State and local governments, including police 
departments, which are funded from local coffers, have a vested interest in 
arresting or ticketing as many people as possible, and in fact, are sometimes 
expressly directed to do so.91 And courts have an incentive to impose fines or 
order forfeitures at the greatest rate possible to ensure budgetary needs are met.  
Put another way, in many places across the country, the people in charge of 
administering justice have a personal stake in the punishment. As a thought 
experiment, if a judge sentenced someone to serve time in a prison in which he 
had a personal financial stake, the urgency of the problem would be obvious. In 
fact, there is no need to wonder—we have seen this problem before.  
                                                                                                                     
 86 Kelley, 766 So. 2d at 839 (quotation marks omitted). 
 87 See C.J. Ciaramella, Poor Neighborhoods Hit Hardest by Asset Forfeiture in 
Chicago, Data Shows, REASON (June 13, 2017), https://reason.com/2017/06/13/poor-
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 88 Id. (emphases added). 
 89 CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 17, at 8; see also Note, How Crime Pays: The 
Unconstitutionality of Modern Civil Asset Forfeiture as a Tool of Criminal Law 
Enforcement, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2387 (2018). 
 90 See, e.g., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF PA., GUILTY PROPERTY 10 (June 2015), 
http://bit.ly/ 2PFet3s [https://perma.cc/ZA2P-8H7W]; BACK ON THE ROAD CAL., STOPPED, 
FINED, ARRESTED: RACIAL BIAS IN POLICING AND TRAFFIC COURTS IN CALIFORNIA 1, 10–19 
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 91 See, e.g., Terrence McCoy, Ferguson Shows How a Police Force Can Turn into a 
Plundering ‘Collection Agency,’ WASH. POST (Mar. 5, 2015), https://www.washington 
post.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/03/05/ferguson-shows-how-a-police-force-can 
-turn-into-a-plundering-collection-agency/?utm_term=.e2c31fbfe295 [on file with 
Ohio State Law Journal]. 
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In the early 2000s, Mark Ciavarella, a judge on the Luzerne County Court 
of Common Pleas in Pennsylvania, was sentenced to twenty-eight years in 
prison after a federal jury found him guilty of a host of crimes relating to a 
scheme of accepting money in return for imposing harsh sentences on juvenile 
defendants to increase occupancy at a for-profit juvenile detention center.92 The 
scheme came to be known as the “Kids for Cash” scandal.93 The sensation of 
this scandal captivated the nation. It has been the subject of a full-length 
documentary,94 the centerpiece of a popular podcast,95 and similar schemes 
have been featured on numerous hit TV shows.96  
Most would agree that locking kids up for personal financial gain is 
monstrous. But it is not all that different from what happens every day in courts 
across the country.97 We know that police officers are pressured into arresting 
poor people of color for minor crimes for financial reasons, and that judges are 
imposing exorbitant financial punishment for said crimes because they operate 
in systems in which that financial punishment is critical to a fully funded 
government—the same government that pays their salaries. One former judge 
on Fresno, California’s Superior Court explained that he “was under pressure to 
collect fines and fees. When counties stopped funding the courts and the state 
took over, the budget was cut and there was a struggle to find revenue 
sources.”98 This judge “saw firsthand how excessive fines, fees and penalties 
can negatively impact peoples’ [sic] lives.”99 This caused him to be “concerned 
                                                                                                                     
 92 See United States v. Ciavarella, 716 F.3d 705, 713–17 (3d Cir. 2013). See generally 
Walter Pavlo, Pennsylvania Judge Gets ‘Life Sentence’ for Prison Kickback Scheme, FORBES 
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 93 Ciavarella, 716 F.3d at 713. 
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the two schemes. 
 98 Robert J. Thompson, Robert J. Thompson: Unreasonable Traffic Fines Violate 
Constitutional Rights, FRESNO BEE (Aug. 24, 2015), https://www.fresnobee.com/ 
opinion/op-ed/article32237655.html [https://perma.cc/6MGX-9BT5]. 
 99 Id.  
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about how these charges can harm people and, in [his] opinion, violate the 
Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution’s ban on excessive fines.”100 
Yet despite these serious constitutional concerns, the pervasive practice of 
using fines as a funding source does not garner nearly as much attention as it 
should. Instead, it is largely accepted as the status quo.101 While such practices 
persist, as many states start to grapple with the Excessive Fines Clause for the 
first time,102 the fact that in many jurisdictions there is a real incentive for courts 
to impose fines and forfeitures to generate revenue should be kept in mind.  
Given that fines and forfeitures are so frequently used, courts need clear 
guidelines for determining whether financial punishment is excessive. This is 
especially so given that defendants do not have a constitutional right to counsel 
when the only punishment being imposed is financial.103 Often, when people 
are being fined exorbitant amounts for minor infractions and risk losing their 
jobs, homes, and health, there is no lawyer to advocate that the punishment being 
imposed is unconstitutional.104 Thus, courts should be vigilant in ensuring 
financial punishment abides by the Constitution. Unfortunately, it is hard for 
courts to undertake this task because the Supreme Court has yet to provide a 
sufficient guide for courts to use when deciding whether a fine comports with 
the Constitution.  
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 101 Some jurisdictions are starting to limit courts’ ability to impose financial costs on 
criminal defendants. See, e.g., Alex Kornya et al., Crimsumerism: Combating Consumer 
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v. 1997 Chevrolet, 160 A.3d 153, 162 n.7 (Pa. 2017); State v. Real Prop. at 633 E. 640 No., 
994 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 2000); Vanderbilt Mortg. & Fin. v. Cole, 740 S.E.2d 562, 570 
n.10 (W. Va. 2013). The Supreme Court of Indiana in Timbs joined two state courts of last 
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states. See One (1) Charter Arms, Bulldog 44 Special v. State ex rel. Moore, 721 So. 2d 620, 
623 (Miss. 1998); State v. 2003 Chevrolet Pickup, 202 P.3d 782, 783 (Mont. 2009). 
 103 In Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979), the Supreme Court held “that 
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 104 BANNON ET AL., supra note 90, at 12. 
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III. UNITED STATES V. BAJAKAJIAN AND THE CONFUSION LEFT IN ITS 
WAKE 
The Eighth Amendment was ratified in 1791.105 It took the Supreme Court 
198 years to first opine on the Excessive Fines Clause and, to date, the Supreme 
Court has discussed the Clause only five times.106 In those five decisions, the 
Supreme Court has provided little guidance on what renders a fine 
constitutionally excessive. In the wake of the Supreme Court’s silence, lower 
courts have been left to come up with their own tests to decide whether financial 
punishment violates the Constitution. Unsurprisingly, courts have come up with 
different tests. Despite the diverging tests, when the Court took up the Excessive 
Fines Clause last Term in Timbs, it still did not provide further guidance on what 
factors courts should consider when deciding whether a fine or forfeiture 
violates of the Eighth Amendment. 
A. The Supreme Court’s Excessive Fines Clause Jurisprudence and the 
Evolution of the “Grossly Disproportional” Standard 
The Supreme Court first interpreted the Excessive Fines Clause in its 1989 
decision, Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.107 There, the Court 
held that the Clause does not apply to civil damages awards.108 The Court gave 
three reasons for its ruling in light of the “purposes and concerns” of the Eighth 
Amendment “as illuminated by its history.”109 First, the Court noted that the 
“the word ‘fine’ was understood to mean a payment to a sovereign as 
punishment for some offense.”110 Second, history showed that the “Eighth 
Amendment clearly was adopted with the particular intent of placing limits on 
the powers of the new Government. . . . [T]he primary focus of the Eighth 
Amendment was the potential for governmental abuse of its ‘prosecutorial’ 
power . . . .”111 Finally, the Court reasoned that the Eighth Amendment was 
based on the English Bill of Rights of 1689;112 the British adopted this provision 
“to curb the excesses of English judges” at a time when fines were becoming 
“even more excessive and partisan, and some opponents of the King were forced 
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 106 See id. See generally United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998); Austin v. 
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to remain in prison because they could not pay the huge monetary penalties that 
had been assessed.”113 These facts led the Court to conclude that the “Excessive 
Fines Clause was intended to limit only those fines directly imposed by, and 
payable to, the government.”114  
Four years later, the Court handed down two cases dealing with the 
Excessive Fines Clause: Alexander v. United States115 and Austin v. United 
States.116 In Alexander, the Court held that the Excessive Fines Clause applies 
to “in personam criminal forfeiture”—where the government indicts “the 
property used or derived from the crime along with the defendant”117—because 
that is “a form of monetary punishment no different, for Eighth Amendment 
purposes, from a traditional ‘fine.’”118 Then, in Austin, the Court decided that 
in rem civil forfeitures—civil actions brought by the government directly 
against property involved in criminal activity119—are also governed by the 
Eighth Amendment.120  
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 117 Types of Federal Forfeiture, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Feb. 1, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/afp/types-federal-forfeiture [https://perma.cc/ZG9V-A8NT]. 
 118 Alexander, 509 U.S. at 558–59. In Alexander, the Petitioner, who was convicted of 
violating federal obscenity and racketeering laws in connection with his running more than 
a dozen adult stores and theaters, argued that the almost nine million dollar forfeiture that 
was assessed for his crimes was unconstitutionally excessive. Id. at 547–49. After finding 
that the forfeiture was covered by the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause, the 
Court remanded the case back to the court of appeals to decide in the first instance whether 
the forfeiture was excessive. Id. at 559. The Court said nothing about how the lower court 
was supposed to undertake this inquiry. See id. 
 119 Types of Federal Forfeiture, supra note 117.  
 120 Austin, 509 U.S. at 604. In Austin, the federal government commenced forfeiture 
proceedings in district court, seeking forfeiture of Austin’s mobile home and auto body shop 
after Austin was convicted of drug-related offenses in state court. Id. at 604–06. Austin 
argued the forfeiture violated the Excessive Fines Clause, whereas the government argued 
that the Clause does not apply to the civil proceedings. Id. at 605–07. The Court found that 
the forfeiture in question was subject to the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against 
excessive fines because historically, government forfeitures were considered punitive, and 
here, the forfeiture statute was only implicated if the property sought to be seized was “use[d] 
to facilitate the commission of a drug-related crime punishable by more than one year’s 
imprisonment.” Id. at 618–20. Austin then advocated for the Court to apply a “multifactor 
test for determining whether a forfeiture is constitutionally ‘excessive,’” but the Court 
instead sent the case back to the “lower courts to consider that question in the first instance.” 
Id. at 622–23. The “multi-factor” test that Austin proposed was that the Court should 
consider:  
1. Whether the property seized constitutes the owner’s livelihood or means to earn a 
living. 
2. Whether the property seized is the owner’s homestead. 
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It was not until its 1998 decision in Bajakajian that the Supreme Court 
announced a test for determining whether a fine is constitutionally excessive.121 
And in announcing the test, the Court for the first time found that a financial 
punishment violated the Eighth Amendment.122 
Hosep Bajakajian was at Los Angeles International Airport awaiting his 
flight when customs agents found $230,000 in his checked luggage; between 
him and his wife, customs officials found $357,144.123 Mr. Bajakajian did not 
declare on his customs forms that he had that much money.124 He was therefore 
charged with and pleaded guilty to the federal crime of failing to report.125 The 
government thereafter sought forfeiture of the full $357,144.126 
The district court found that the full amount was subject to forfeiture 
because it “was involved in” the offense, but concluded full forfeiture would be 
“‘extraordinarily harsh’ and ‘grossly disproportionate to the offense in 
question,’ and that it would therefore violate the Excessive Fines Clause.”127 
The court ordered Mr. Bajakajian to forfeit only $15,000.128 The government 
appealed the forfeiture order all the way to the Supreme Court.129  
Deciding whether forfeiture of the full amount would violate the Excessive 
Fines Clause, the Court noted that it “had little occasion to interpret, and [it had] 
never actually applied, the Excessive Fines Clause.”130 Indeed, the only clear 
rule from the Court’s cases up until that point was that a fine or forfeiture must 
be “punishment for an offense” to fall within the ambit of the Eighth 
                                                                                                                     
3. The degree to which the owner’s property has been involved in drug activity, and 
whether the property has been purchased or obtained through the proceeds of drug 
activity. 
4. Whether or not the owner has been convicted of a crime related to the forfeiture, the 
severity of the crime, and the severity of the criminal sentence imposed upon the owner 
of the property—i.e. the total punishment imposed on the owner, including the 
forfeiture. 
5. The extent of the criminal behavior of the owner of the property and the need for 
deterrence. 
6. The extent to which the government necessarily expended its funds to interdict drug 
activity involving this property. 
Brief for Petitioner at 47–48, Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993) (No. 92-6073), 
1993 WL 347335, at *47–48.  
 121 United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 322–23 (1998). 
 122 Id. at 337. 
 123 Id. at 324–25. 
 124 Id.  
 125 Id. at 325. 
 126 Id.  
 127 Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 326. 
 128 Id. The district court also sentenced Mr. Bajakajian to three years’ probation and 
ordered him to pay a $5000 fine. Id. 
 129 Id. at 321. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. See United States 
v. Bajakajian, 84 F.3d 334, 335 (9th Cir. 1996), aff’d, 524 U.S. 321 (1998).  
 130 Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 327.  
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Amendment.131 Here, the Court had “little trouble concluding that the forfeiture 
of currency” constituted punishment, thus falling within the Eighth 
Amendment’s reach, because it was imposed at the “culmination of a criminal 
proceeding and require[d] conviction of an underlying felony.”132 
After finding the forfeiture was subject to the Eighth Amendment’s bar 
against excessive fines, the Court turned to the question of whether forfeiture of 
the full $357,144 would be constitutionally excessive.133 The Court, 
recognizing it had “not articulated a standard for determining whether a punitive 
forfeiture is constitutionally excessive,” began by emphasizing that the 
“touchstone of the constitutional inquiry under the Excessive Fines Clause is the 
principle of proportionality: The amount of the forfeiture must bear some 
relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish.”134 The 
Court then looked to the text and history of the Excessive Fines Clause and 
found that they provided “little guidance as to how disproportional a punitive 
forfeiture must be to the gravity of an offense in order to be ‘excessive.’”135 This 
is so, the Court found, because the term “excessive” is a truism—it says nothing 
about how to measure excessiveness.136 And the Excessive Fines Clause was 
barely discussed in the “debates over the ratification of the Bill of Rights,” so 
there was nothing that the Court could find there to help guide its analysis.137  
The Court was thus left to “rely on other considerations in deriving a 
constitutional excessiveness standard,” finding two “particularly relevant.”138 
The first was that the Court drew from its Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Clause cases to assert that “judgments about the appropriate punishment for an 
offense belong in the first instance to the legislature,”139 meaning that if a 
punishment is within the range set by the legislature, there is a presumption of 
constitutionality.140 The second was that the Court believed that any “judicial 
determination regarding the gravity of a particular criminal offense” was bound 
to be “inherently imprecise.”141 The Court therefore concluded that both of these 
principles “counsel against requiring strict proportionality between the amount 
of a punitive forfeiture and the gravity of a criminal offense.”142 Instead, the 
Court adopted “the standard of gross disproportionality articulated in [its] Cruel 
and Unusual Punishments Clause precedents.”143 
                                                                                                                     
 131 Id. at 328. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. at 334. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. at 335. 
 136 See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 335.  
 137 Id.  
 138 Id. at 336.  
 139 Id.  
 140 See id. (synthesizing from previous decisions, including Solem v. Helm and Gore v. 
United States, that the legislature deserves substantial deference in the punishment context). 
 141 Id.  
 142 Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 336.  
 143 Id.  
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Applying this standard to Mr. Bajakajian’s case, the Court held that the 
forfeiture of the full $357,144 would be constitutionally excessive.144 Two facts 
compelled the Court’s conclusion. First, the Court noted that the money was the 
proceeds of legal activity; Mr. Bajakajian was guilty only of a reporting offense, 
the maximum fine for which was only $5000.145 To the Court, this confirmed 
that the legislature believed this to be a crime that had “a minimal level of 
culpability.”146 Second, the Court looked at the harm caused by Mr. Bajakajian 
and found it to be “minimal”—his failure to report the full amount of currency 
affected only the government “in a relatively minor way” in that the government 
was “deprived only of the information that $357,144 had left the country.”147 
Thus, said the Court, “[c]omparing the gravity of [Mr. Bajakajian]’s crime with 
the $357,144 forfeiture the Government seeks, we conclude that such a 
forfeiture would be grossly disproportional to the gravity of his offense.”148 
Bajakajian was the first and last time the Supreme Court applied the 
“grossly disproportional” standard in an Excessive Fines Clause case.149 
Without further guidance, courts have been left to divine their own tests to 
determine whether fines are grossly disproportional.150 This lack of guidance 
has created somewhat of a mess.151 
                                                                                                                     
 144 Id. at 337.  
 145 Id. at 337–38. 
 146 Id. at 339. 
 147 Id.  
 148 Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 339–40. 
 149 See id.  
 150 Professor Barry Johnson provides a robust critique of the Bajakajian decision. See 
generally Barry L. Johnson, Purging the Cruel and Unusual: The Autonomous Excessive 
Fines Clause and Desert-Based Constitutional Limits on Forfeiture After United States v. 
Bajakajian, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 461 (2000). Professor Johnson concludes that the “grossly 
disproportional” standard that the Court announced in Bajakajian “is inconsistent with the 
language, history, and purposes of the Excessive Fines Clause and may serve as a significant 
barrier to meaningful constitutional limitations on forfeiture.” Id. at 465. Professor Beth 
Colgan has also strongly critiqued the Supreme Court’s Excessive Fines Clause 
jurisprudence. See generally Beth A. Colgan, Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, 102 
CALIF. L. REV. 277 (2014) [hereinafter Colgan, Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause]. After 
performing an extensive review of sources contemporaneous to the ratification of the Bill of 
Rights, Professor Colgan labeled the Court’s “narrow interpretation” of the Excessive Fines 
Clause as “both methodologically and substantively suspect.” Id. at 283. 
 151 One scholar identifies three areas of “doctrinal uncertainty” after Bajakajian: “(1) 
how to conceptualize a penalty’s harshness for constitutional purposes, (2) how to determine 
the severity of a given offense for the purposes of the disproportionality analysis, and (3) 
how to determine the point at which the relationship between a given penalty and a given 
offense becomes unconstitutionally disproportionate.” McLean, supra note 13, at 845.  
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B. The Lower Courts Flesh Out the “Grossly Disproportional” 
Standard 
After Bajakajian, courts began to create tests to determine whether a fine is 
“grossly disproportional.” Most of the federal courts of appeals, after examining 
Bajakajian, derived multifactor tests to answer this question. Absent Supreme 
Court guidance, it is not surprising that different courts have come up with 
different tests.  
Most circuits—the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh 
Circuits—consider the following four factors when determining whether a fine 
is constitutionally excessive:  
(1) the essence of the crime of the defendant and its relation to other criminal 
activity, (2) whether the defendant fits into the class of persons for whom the 
statute was principally designed, (3) the maximum sentence and fine that could 
have been imposed, and (4) the nature of the harm caused by the defendant’s 
conduct.152  
                                                                                                                     
 152 United States v. Mora, 644 F. App’x 316, 317 (5th Cir. 2016) (considering “(a) the 
essence of the defendant’s crime and its relationship to other criminal activity; (b) whether 
the defendant was within the class of people for whom the statute of conviction was 
principally designed; (c) the maximum sentence, including the fine that could have been 
imposed; and (d) the nature of the harm resulting from the defendant’s conduct”); see also 
United States v. Young, 618 F. App’x 96, 97 (3d Cir. 2015) (“In assessing the proportionality 
of a fine, we consider (1) the nature of the offense or offenses; (2) whether the defendant 
falls into the class of persons for whom the statute was designed—e.g., money launderers, 
drug dealers, or tax evaders; (3) the maximum fine authorized by statute and the sentencing 
guidelines which are associated with the offense or offenses; and (4) the harm caused by the 
defendant’s conduct.”); United States v. Malewicka, 664 F.3d 1099, 1104 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(considering: “(1) the essence of the crime and its relation to other criminal activity; (2) 
whether the defendant fit into the class of persons for whom the statute was principally 
designed; (3) the maximum sentence and fine that could have been imposed; and (4) the 
nature of the harm caused by the defendant’s conduct.”); United States v. Zakharia, 418 F. 
App’x 414, 422 (6th Cir. 2011) (“Relevant factors to consider include the nature of the 
offense and its relation to other criminal activity, the potential fine under the advisory 
Guidelines range, the maximum sentence and fine that could have been imposed, and the 
harm caused by the defendant’s conduct.”); United States v. Jalaram, Inc., 599 F.3d 347, 
355–56 (4th Cir. 2010) (considering: “(1) the amount of the forfeiture and its relationship to 
the authorized penalty. . . . ; (2) the nature and extent of the criminal activity. . . ; (3) the 
relationship between the crime charged and other crimes. . . . ; and (4) the harm caused by 
the charged crime.”); United States v. Varrone, 554 F.3d 327, 331 (2d Cir. 2009). The Tenth 
Circuit has acknowledged that the Bajakajian Court considered these factors but considered 
“[o]ne of the most important” factors to be “Congress’s judgment about the appropriate 
punishment for the owner’s offense.” See United States v. Wagoner Cty. Real Estate, 278 
F.3d 1091, 1100 (10th Cir. 2002). The D.C. Circuit has used the factors as articulated by the 
Second Circuit when conducting an Excessive Fines Clause analysis. See Collins v. SEC, 
736 F.3d 521, 526–27 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
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The Ninth Circuit considers a similar set of factors, the major difference 
being that it notes that the list of factors is not exhaustive.153  
The Eleventh Circuit does not consider the “essence of the crime,” but 
considers the other factors most circuits consider.154 And the First Circuit 
considers the same three factors that the Eleventh Circuit considers, but also 
expressly considers a defendant’s financial circumstances.155 By contrast, the 
Eleventh Circuit has said that it will not take into account “the characteristics of 
the offender” when conducting an Excessive Fines Clause analysis.156  
The Eighth Circuit has purposefully avoided announcing a definitive set of 
factors.157 Instead, that court offered “relevant” considerations to whether a fine 
is unconstitutional.158 These include: “the extent and duration of the criminal 
conduct, the gravity of the offense in comparison to the severity of the criminal 
sanction, and the value of the forfeited property.”159 In addition to these factors, 
the Eighth Circuit identified “other helpful inquiries such as an assessment of 
the personal benefit reaped by the defendant, the defendant’s motive and 
culpability and . . . the extent that the defendant’s interest and the enterprise 
itself are tainted by criminal conduct.”160 And like the First Circuit, the Eighth 
Circuit also takes account of “the defendant’s ability to pay.”161 
Like the federal courts of appeals, the state courts of last resort that have 
considered the issue have also derived varying multifactor tests, so there is not 
                                                                                                                     
 153 United States v. $132,245.00 in U.S. Currency, 764 F.3d 1055, 1058 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(considering: “(1) the nature and extent of the crime, (2) whether the violation was related to 
other illegal activities, (3) the other penalties that may be imposed for the violation, and (4) 
the extent of the harm caused”). 
 154 See United States v. Sperrazza, 804 F.3d 1113, 1127 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting United 
States v. Browne, 505 F.3d 1229, 1281 (11th Cir. 2007)) (“We determine whether a fine is 
‘grossly disproportional’ by considering ‘(1) whether the defendant falls into the class of 
persons at whom the criminal statute was principally directed; (2) other penalties authorized 
by the legislature (or the Sentencing Commission); and (3) the harm caused by the 
defendant.’”). 
 155 United States v. Jose, 499 F.3d 105, 113 (1st Cir. 2007) (taking into account whether 
the forfeiture “would deprive [defendant] of his livelihood”); United States v. Heldeman, 
402 F.3d 220, 223 (1st Cir. 2005) (considering: “(1) whether the defendant falls into the class 
of persons at whom the criminal statute was principally directed; (2) other penalties 
authorized by the legislature (or the Sentencing Commission); and (3) the harm caused by 
the defendant”). 
 156 United States v. 817 Ne. 29th Drive, 175 F.3d 1304, 1311 (11th Cir. 1999); see also 
United States v. Dicter, 198 F.3d 1284, 1292 n.11 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[W]e do not take into 
account the personal impact of a forfeiture on the specific defendant in determining whether 
the forfeiture violates the Eighth Amendment.”). 
 157 See United States v. Dodge Caravan Grand SE/Sport Van, 387 F.3d 758, 763 (8th 
Cir. 2004). 
 158 Id. 
 159 United States v. $63,530.00 in U.S. Currency, 781 F.3d 949, 957–58 (8th Cir. 2015). 
 160 Dodge Caravan, 387 F.3d at 763 (internal quotations and brackets omitted). The 
Eighth Circuit further said that this list is not meant to be exhaustive. Id.  
 161 United States v. Aleff, 772 F.3d 508, 512 (8th Cir. 2014). 
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a uniform approach among state courts either for determining whether financial 
punishment violates the Eighth Amendment.162 
The problem with the different tests used by these courts is not that they are 
wrong163—they are useful guides to figuring out just what “grossly 
disproportional” means. Rather, the issue is that they are incomplete. In 
(understandably) focusing on formulating a way to decide whether a fine is 
“grossly disproportional,” courts have lost sight of broader constitutional 
                                                                                                                     
 162 For example, West Virginia uses the same test used by most circuits. See, e.g., Dean 
v. State, 736 S.E.2d 40, 50 (W. Va. 2012) (considering: “(1) the amount of the forfeiture and 
its relationship to the authorized penalty; (2) the nature and extent of the criminal activity; 
(3) the relationship between the crime charged and other crimes; and (4) the harm caused by 
the charged crime”). Minnesota and Utah use the three-factor cruel and unusual punishment 
test the Supreme Court announced in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983). See, e.g., Miller 
v. One 2001 Pontiac Aztek, 669 N.W.2d 893, 895 (Minn. 2003) (considering: “1) the gravity 
of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; 2) a comparison of the contested fine with 
fines imposed for the commission of the other crimes in the same jurisdiction; and 3) 
comparison of the contested fine with fines imposed for commission of the same crime in 
other jurisdictions”) (citing Solem, 463 U.S. at 290–91); State v. Real Prop. at 633 E. 640 
N., 994 P.2d 1254, 1258 (Utah 2000) (considering the same). The Illinois multi-factor test 
focuses on the relationship between the property sought to be seized and the crime in 
question. See, e.g., People ex rel. Hartrich v. 2010 Harley-Davidson, 104 N.E.3d 1179, 1184 
(Ill. 2018) (considering: “(1) the gravity of the offense against the harshness of the penalty, 
(2) how integral the property was in the commission of the offense, and (3) whether the 
criminal conduct involving the defendant property was extensive in terms of time and/or 
spatial use” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Georgia uses a multi-factor test with 
multiple subparts. See, e.g., Howell v. State, 656 S.E.2d 511, 512 (Ga. 2008) (quoting von 
Hofe v. United States, 492 F.3d 175, 186 (2d Cir. 2007)) (considering: “(1) the harshness, or 
gross disproportionality, of the forfeiture in comparison to the gravity of the offense, giving 
due regard to (a) the offense committed and its relation to other criminal activity, (b) whether 
the claimant falls within the class of persons for whom the statute was designed, (c) the 
punishments available, and (d) the harm caused by the claimant’s conduct; (2) the nexus 
between the property and the criminal offenses, including the deliberate nature of the use 
and the temporal and spatial extent of the use; and (3) the culpability of each claimant”). 
New York’s test expressly considers the “economic circumstances of the defendant.” See, 
e.g., Cty. of Nassau v. Canavan, 802 N.E.2d 616, 622 (N.Y. 2003) (considering “such factors 
as the seriousness of the offense, the severity of the harm caused and of the potential harm 
had the defendant not been caught, the relative value of the forfeited property and the 
maximum punishment to which defendant could have been subject for the crimes charged, 
and the economic circumstances of the defendant”). And South Dakota’s and Pennsylvania’s 
tests are different from the above. See, e.g., State v. One 2011 White Forest River XLR Toy 
Hauler, 857 N.W.2d 427, 430 (S.D. 2014) (considering “the extent and duration of the 
criminal conduct, the gravity of the offense weighed against the severity of the criminal 
sanction, and the value of the property forfeited”); Commonwealth v. 1997 Chevrolet & 
Contents Seized from Young, 160 A.3d 153, 169 (Pa. 2017) (considering “the penalties that 
the legislature has authorized compared to those to which the defendant was subjected; 
whether the violation was isolated or part of a pattern of misbehavior; and the nature of the 
harm caused by the defendant”).  
 163 Except, arguably, for the Eleventh Circuit’s refusal to consider a defendant’s 
economic circumstances. See infra note 206. 
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principles at play, largely ignoring other areas of the Supreme Court’s Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence and the motivations behind the ratification and 
incorporation of the Excessive Fines Clause. In so doing, the tests do not 
adequately account for the breadth of protections the Excessive Fines Clause 
was designed to provide.  
In short, although the Bajakajian Court announced a standard for 
determining whether a fine or forfeiture violates the Excessive Fines Clause, the 
standard created more questions than it provided answers. The Court had the 
occasion to clear up the confusion when it took up Timbs v. Indiana—a case 
that presented the question of whether the Excessive Fines Clause constricts the 
states.164 Unfortunately, the Court did not take the opportunity to provide the 
much-needed clarity. 
C. The Supreme Court Revisits the Excessive Fines Clause in Timbs 
Before the October 2018 Term, the Supreme Court had not considered 
whether the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Excessive Fines Clause 
against the states.165 The Court finally decided to answer that question in Timbs, 
after the Indiana Supreme Court held that the Excessive Fines Clause 
“constrain[ed] only federal action.”166 The facts of Timbs are straightforward: 
Mr. Timbs pleaded guilty to dealing heroin and conspiracy to commit theft.167 
For his crimes, the trial court sentenced Mr. Timbs to “one year of home 
detention and five years of probation,” and assessed fees and costs against Mr. 
Timbs in the amount of $1203.168 After Mr. Timbs was sentenced, Indiana 
initiated civil forfeiture proceedings and sought to seize Mr. Timbs’ 2012 Land 
Rover that he had recently purchased for $42,000, arguing it was the vehicle Mr. 
Timbs had “used to facilitate violation of a criminal statute”—i.e., he used the 
SUV to ferry drugs across the state.169 The trial court held that forfeiture of the 
Land Rover would be “grossly disproportional to the gravity of Timbs’s offense, 
[and] hence, unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines 
Clause.”170 Indiana’s intermediate appellate court affirmed the trial court’s 
judgment.171 But the Indiana Supreme Court reversed, refusing to enforce the 
Excessive Fines Clause against the state given the fact that the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                     
 164 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019) (No. 
17-1091), 2018 WL 704837, at *1.  
 165 See McLean, supra note 13, at 844–45 (noting that the confusion surrounding the 
Court’s decision in Bajakajian “has been exacerbated by a lack of clarity even on the basic 
question of whether the Excessive Fines Clause has been incorporated against the states”).  
 166 Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 686 (2019).  
 167 Id.  
 168 Id.  
 169 Id.; see State v. Timbs, 84 N.E.3d 1179, 1181 (Ind. 2017), vacated, 139 S. Ct. 682 
(2019), remanded to 134 N.E.3d 12 (Ind. 2019). 
 170 Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 686.  
 171 Id.  
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had not “decide[d] the issue authoritatively.”172 The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to decide the incorporation issue once and for all.173 
The Supreme Court explained that the prohibition against excessive fines is 
deeply rooted in Anglo-American history.174 The Timbs Court traced the history 
of the Excessive Fines Clause back to Magna Carta, which required that 
“economic sanctions ‘be proportioned to the wrong’ and ‘not be so large as to 
deprive an offender of his livelihood.’”175 The Court also explained that the 
adoption of the Excessive Fines Clause “resonated as well with similar colonial-
era provisions” because in 1787, eight states had similar provisions in their 
constitutions.176 The Court then fast-forwarded to 1868, when the Fourteenth 
Amendment was ratified, and noted that thirty-five of thirty-seven states 
“expressly prohibited excessive fines.”177 After conducting this historical 
review, the Court surmised that the “protection against excessive fines has been 
a constant shield throughout Anglo-American history,” because without such 
protections, “[e]xcessive fines can be used, for example, to retaliate against or 
chill the speech of political enemies,” or can be imposed “‘in a measure out of 
accord with the penal goals of retribution and deterrence,’ for ‘fines are a source 
of revenue,’ while other forms of punishment ‘cost a State money.’”178 The 
Court concluded, “[i]n short, the historical and logical case for concluding that 
the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Excessive Fines Clause is 
overwhelming.”179  
Having decided that the Excessive Fines Clause is incorporated against the 
states, rather than deciding the issue itself, the Supreme Court remanded the 
case back to the Indiana Supreme Court for it to determine whether the state 
would violate Mr. Timbs’s rights if it seized his Land Rover as punishment for 
his crimes.180  
                                                                                                                     
 172 Timbs, 84 N.E.3d at 1183–84. 
 173 The Court had previously said that the Fourteenth Amendment makes the Excessive 
Fines Clause applicable to the states. See, e.g., Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 
532 U.S. 424, 433–34 (2001) (“[The Fourteenth Amendment] makes the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition against excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishments 
applicable to the States.”). However, the Court later clarified that this statement was dicta. 
See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 765 n.13 (2010) (“We never have decided 
whether the . . . Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of excessive fines applies to the States 
through the Due Process Clause.”). 
 174 Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 689. 
 175 Id. at 687–88 (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 
271 (1989)) (brackets omitted). 
 176 Id. at 688. 
 177 Id.  
 178 Id. at 689 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 979 n.9 (1991)). 
 179 Id.  
 180 See, e.g., Order Inviting Amicus Curiae Briefing, State v. Timbs, 134 N.E.2d 12 (Ind. 
2019) (No. 27S04-1702-MI-70) (noting that the Supreme Court “did not address whether 
forfeiture of Appellee’s vehicle would violate the Excessive Fines Clause,” and inviting 
briefing on the question).  
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In the Timbs opinion, the Court made no mention of the prolific use of fines 
and forfeitures as funding mechanisms.181 Nor did the Court discuss the fact that 
fines and forfeitures are disproportionately imposed against people of color.182 
To be clear, that information was before the Court.183 Amicus briefs from a wide 
range of groups highlighted these concerns.184 For example, the NAACP Legal 
Defense Fund cited data that showed that state and local governments are 
“increasingly us[ing] fines to punish crime” “to fund local government” while 
at the same time “disparately imposing [] fines against Black Americans and 
other people of color.”185 The Drug Policy Alliance, along with other groups, 
presented the Court with information showing that state and local governments 
use forfeiture “proceedings as a mechanism for funding their operations—with 
assets seized predominantly from the poor and people of color.”186 And the 
ACLU, along with other groups, similarly explained that state and local 
governments use “fines, fees, and forfeitures to raise revenue,” which 
“disproportionately harm communities of color for reasons that include the 
longstanding racial and ethnic wealth gap and higher rates of poverty and 
unemployment.”187 
Despite being presented with information detailing how fines and 
forfeitures are being abused across the country, the Supreme Court did not give 
any guidance on how courts should test whether financial punishment complies 
with the Eighth Amendment.188 This is especially troubling given (a) the reality 
of how fines and forfeitures are imposed today; (b) the fact that, in light of 
                                                                                                                     
 181 See Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 682–98. 
 182 See id.  
 183 See id. at 697 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 184 See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc. in Support 
of Petitioner at 19–20, Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019) (No. 17-1091), 2018 WL 
4358109, at *19–20. 
 185 Id. 
 186 Brief of Amicus Curiae Drug Policy All. et al. in Support of Petitioner at 2, Timbs v. 
Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019) (No.17-1091), 2018 WL 4381212, at *2. 
 187 Brief of Amicus Curiae Am. Civil Liberties Union et al. in Support of Petitioner at 
20–21, Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019) (No. 17-1091), 2018 WL 4462202, at *11, 
20–21 [hereinafter Brief of American Civil Liberties Union]. 
 188 The only time the Timbs Court uses the phrase “grossly disproportional” is when 
discussing the trial court’s holding. See Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 686. Granted, the test for 
measuring excessiveness was not the precise issue before the Court in Timbs. Id. at 687 
(determining the incorporation of the Excessive Fines Clause). But in the past, the Supreme 
Court has given guidance to the lower court as to the analysis that it must perform on remand. 
See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 267 (2005) (remanding the case and 
ordering “the District Court [to] impose a sentence in accordance with today’s opinions”); 
Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 678 (1989) (“Upon remand the 
Court of Appeals should examine the criteria used by the Service in determining what 
materials are classified and in deciding whom to test under this rubric. In assessing the 
reasonableness of requiring tests of these employees, the court should also consider pertinent 
information bearing upon the employees’ privacy expectations, as well as the supervision to 
which these employees are already subject.”). 
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Timbs, many courts will for the first time determine whether a fine or forfeiture 
violates the Eighth Amendment; and (c) the lower courts do not have a singular 
approach for deciding this important constitutional question. Thus, the Eighth 
Amendment’s protections against excessive fines vary from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction, with each jurisdiction free to apply its own test so long as it includes 
the phrase “grossly disproportional.” The lack of guidance means that the lower 
courts have no clear roadmap to check against potential constitutional abuses. 
To fill this void, the next section offers four factors, which gel with the 
Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and the animating purpose 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, for courts to consider when deciding whether a 
fine or forfeiture is constitutionally excessive. 
IV. A FOUR-FACTOR APPROACH TO AN EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE 
ANALYSIS 
When announcing the “grossly disproportional” test in Bajakajian, the 
Supreme Court did not purport to set forward an exhaustive set of factors for 
lower courts to use when determining whether a fine is constitutionally 
excessive.189 This lack of guidance has been a chief criticism of the Bajakajian 
opinion.190 
But that does not mean there are not principles that can be gleaned from the 
Court’s Excessive Fines Clause cases that can be used to craft a more concrete 
test. There are three defining aspects of the Court’s Excessive Fines Clause 
jurisprudence that are instructive for determining what courts should consider 
when deciding whether a fine or forfeiture is constitutionally excessive. First, 
the Court has made clear that it will look to its Eighth Amendment Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause jurisprudence when deciding how best to interpret 
and enforce the Excessive Fines Clause.191 As evidence, the Court borrowed the 
“grossly disproportional” standard from its Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
                                                                                                                     
 189 See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 336 (1998) (explaining that the Court 
finds two considerations to be “particularly relevant” in a constitutional excessiveness 
analysis, but not precluding the use of factors; further stating that lower courts must apply 
the “grossly disproportional” standard de novo).  
 190 For example, one author lamented that Bajakajian “provokes more questions than it 
answers about the scope and application of the Excessive Fines Clause.” Solomon, supra 
note 12, at 875. The article goes on to express frustration that “the Bajakajian Court made 
broad pronouncements about an emerging constitutional protection, yet issued a narrow 
holding and rationale that will likely limit the decision’s precedential value to a narrow 
subset of cases.” Id. Based on this author’s review of the early case law applying Bajakajian, 
this author came to the conclusion that “the decision’s constitutional import will confuse 
future parties and the lower courts as to the scope and applicability of the Excessive Fines 
Clause, and may unwittingly serve to weaken Excessive Fines Clause protections.” Id. 
 191 See, e.g., Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 336 (the Court calling its “cases interpreting the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause” “particularly relevant” “in deriving a constitutional 
excessiveness standard”).  
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Clause cases.192 Second, the Court has emphasized that the historical 
motivations behind the ratification of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments 
are important when deciding how best to construe the scope of the Excessive 
Fines Clause.193 Third, the Court has reminded throughout its Eighth 
Amendment cases that any punishment that a government imposes must serve 
legitimate penological goals.194  
With these three aspects of the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence in mind,195 in addition to considering whether a fine is grossly 
disproportional to the gravity of the offense, courts should consider these four 
factors when deciding whether a fine violates the Constitution:  
1. Whether the defendant is able to pay the fine. 
2. Whether fines are a significant revenue source in the sentencing 
jurisdiction. 
3. Whether other jurisdictions impose similar fines for similar crimes. 
4. Whether the sentencing jurisdiction disproportionally imposes fines 
against minority defendants. 
Each factor is discussed in turn.  
A. Whether a Defendant is Able to Pay the Fine 
The first factor courts should consider when deciding whether a fine or 
forfeiture is constitutionally excessive is the effect of the punishment on the 
defendant considering their personal circumstances. The Supreme Court in 
Bajakajian expressly left open the question of whether this factor should be 
considered in an Excessive Fines Clause analysis.196 The history of the Eighth 
Amendment compels an answer of “yes.” 
                                                                                                                     
 192 See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (concluding “that a sentence of death 
is grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the crime of rape and is therefore 
forbidden by the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual punishment”). 
 193 See, e.g., Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 687–89 (exploring the “venerable lineage” of the 
Excessive Fines Clause, including the history around when the Eighth Amendment and 
Fourteenth Amendments were ratified). 
 194 See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 71 (2010) (explaining that the “penological 
justifications for the sentencing practice are also relevant to [an Eighth Amendment] 
analysis”); see also Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 689 (“[F]ines may be employed in a measure out of 
accord with the penal goals of retribution and deterrence . . . .” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  
 195 It is important to recognize that in the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause 
context, scholars have lamented that the “grossly disproportional” test is effectively 
toothless; it “has not prevented what were on any measure extremely harsh sentences on 
particular offenders.” Anthony Gray, Mandatory Sentencing Around the World and the Need 
for Reform, 20 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 391, 406 (2017). 
 196 See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 340. In Timbs, the Court described Bajakajian as “taking 
no position on the question whether a person’s income and wealth are relevant considerations 
in judging the excessiveness of a fine.” Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 688 (citing Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 
at 340 n.15).  
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As Timbs explained, since Magna Carta it has been uncontroverted that fines 
“should be proportioned to the offense and that they should not deprive a 
wrongdoer of his livelihood.”197 Thus, since at least 1215,198 it has been an 
established Anglo-Saxon legal principle that criminal fines should not be 
exorbitant to the point of being debilitating.  
The Court then noted that the language of the Excessive Fines Clause “was 
taken verbatim from the English Bill of Rights of 1689.”199 This provision of 
the English Bill of Rights was understood to “formalize[] a longstanding 
prohibition on disproportionate fines.”200 William Blackstone, in his 
Commentaries, maintained that English law had a longstanding principle that 
“no man shall have a larger [fine] imposed upon him, than his circumstances or 
personal estate will bear.”201 Thus, the compact from which the Excessive Fines 
Clause derives its language also was understood to mean that a defendant should 
not be ruined by a fine.  
If a court were to stay true to the Excessive Fines Clause’s history, it would 
consider a defendant’s economic circumstances when deciding whether a fine 
or forfeiture is constitutional. Given the fact that the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly pointed to this history when determining the scope of the Excessive 
Fines Clause,202 this history similarly should guide courts to consider whether a 
fine or forfeiture is excessive in light of the defendant’s personal 
circumstances.203  
                                                                                                                     
 197 Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 335; Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 687–88. The Magna Carta provided 
that “[a] Free-man shall not be amerced for a small fault, but after the manner of the fault; 
and for a great fault after the greatness thereof, saving to him his contentment.” Id. (quoting 
§ 20, 9 Hen. III, ch. 14, in 1 Eng. Stat. at Large 5 (1225)). “Amercements were payments to 
the Crown, and were required of individuals who were ‘in the King’s mercy,’ because of 
some act offensive to the Crown. Those acts ranged from . . . minor criminal offenses, such 
as breach of the King’s peace with force and arms, to ‘civil’ wrongs against the King, such 
as infringing a ‘final concord’ made in the King’s court.” Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco 
Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 269 (1989) (citing 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF 
ENGLISH LAW 519 (2d ed. 1905)). 
 198 Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 687. 
 199 Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 335.  
 200 Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 693. For a longer discussion of the history of the Excessive Fines 
Clause, see id. at 687–89.  
 201 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 372 (1769). The Supreme Court has 
labeled Blackstone’s Commentaries the “definitive summary of [English] common law.” 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 712 (1997). 
 202 Indeed, the Supreme Court’s major Excessive Fines Clause cases all prominently 
feature a discussion of the history of the Excessive Fines Clause. See Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 
687–89; Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 335–37; Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 264–68. 
 203 Beth Colgan, after conducting an exhaustive review of the history of the Excessive 
Fines Clause, explained that “although the mixed record indicates that the principle that fines 
should not prevent defendants from securing a livelihood, was inconsistently applied, the 
idea of saving defendants from persistent impoverishment was a guiding principle reaching 
back to the days of the Magna Carta and the English Bill of Rights, and enduring through 
the ratification of the Eighth Amendment.” Colgan, Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, 
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Moreover, some courts already consider a defendant’s ability to pay when 
conducting an Excessive Fines Clause analysis. For example, the First Circuit 
has said that courts should “consider whether forfeiture would deprive the 
defendant of his or her livelihood,” calling the consideration “deeply rooted in 
the history of the Eighth Amendment.”204 The Eighth Circuit has also held that 
it is a relevant consideration,205 and the Ninth Circuit has strongly intimated the 
same.206 And even before the Supreme Court decided Timbs, several state 
supreme courts had held that the Excessive Fines Clause applies to the states, 
and already considered a defendant’s ability to pay as part of an Excessive Fines 
Clause analysis.207  
Outside of courts performing Excessive Fines Clause analyses, the 
Conference of Chief Justices and Conference of State Court Administrators has 
opined that courts should consider a defendant’s ability to pay when imposing 
                                                                                                                     
supra note 150, at 334–35. Nicholas McLean also conducted a thorough review of the 
Excessive Fines Clause’s history and concluded that “the Excessive Fines Clause of the 
Eighth Amendment can appropriately be understood as encoding two complementary, but 
distinct, constitutional principles: (1) a proportionality principle, linking the penalty to the 
offense, and (2) an additional limiting principle linking the penalty imposed to the offender’s 
economic status and circumstances.” McLean, supra note 13, at 836.  
 204 United States v. Levesque, 546 F.3d 78, 83–84 (1st Cir. 2008). 
 205 See United States v. Lippert, 148 F.3d 974, 978 (8th Cir. 1998) (“Finally, in the case 
of fines, as opposed to forfeitures, the defendant’s ability to pay is a factor under the 
Excessive Fines Clause.”).  
 206 See United States v. Hantzis, 403 F. App’x 170, 172 (9th Cir. 2010) (concluding that 
a criminal fine did not violate the Eighth Amendment because “there was evidence that 
Hantzis was very wealthy, and as he refused to submit a financial affidavit, there was no 
evidence that a fine would deprive him of his livelihood” (internal brackets and quotation 
marks omitted)). There is a circuit split on the issue, however, as the Eleventh Circuit has 
expressly refused to consider a defendant’s economic circumstances when conducting an 
excessive fines analysis. See United States v. Dicter, 198 F.3d 1284, 1292 n.11 (11th Cir. 
1999) (“More important, we do not take into account the personal impact of a forfeiture on 
the specific defendant in determining whether the forfeiture violates the Eighth 
Amendment.”). The Eleventh Circuit reached this conclusion by citing to its decision in 
United States v. 817 Ne. 29th Drive, Wilton Manors, Fla., 175 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 1999), 
where the court claimed that: “The Supreme Court, however, has made clear that whether a 
forfeiture is ‘excessive’ is determined by comparing the amount of the forfeiture to the 
gravity of the offense and not by comparing the amount of the forfeiture to the amount of the 
owner’s assets.” Id. at 1311 (internal citation omitted). However, given that the Supreme 
Court has since made clear it did not rule one way or the other on whether courts should 
consider a defendant’s economic circumstances when considering the constitutionality of a 
fine or forfeiture, see Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 688, the Eleventh Circuit’s decision on this point 
is therefore misguided. 
 207 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 1997 Chevrolet & Contents Seized from Young, 160 
A.3d 153, 188 (Pa. 2017) (considering “whether the forfeiture would deprive the [defendant] 
of his or her livelihood”); Cty. of Nassau v. Canavan, 802 N.E.2d 616, 622 (N.Y. 2003) 
(considering “the economic circumstances of the defendant”).  
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fines,208 and a number of courts expressly require this type of assessment.209 
Moreover, courts already take into account a party’s economic circumstances in 
various other contexts, including when calculating a sentence under the federal 
guidelines,210 and when assessing bail,211 civil penalties,212 tax liens,213 and 
sanctions.214 To the extent a court is hesitant about considering a defendant’s 
economic circumstances as part of an Excessive Fines Clause analysis, it has 
already been done by courts in this context and is routinely done by courts in 
other contexts. 
Finally, consideration of a defendant’s ability to pay is consistent with the 
“touchstone” principle of proportionality that undergirds the Eighth 
Amendment.215 As one scholar observed, taking into account a defendant’s 
economic circumstances ensures a fine or forfeiture is “tailored to serve the ends 
of punishment as opposed to one that is unnecessary or gratuitous.”216 Put 
differently, it would be grossly disproportional for a court to assess a fine that 
will have devastating effects for a crime that is relatively benign. For example, 
if a court imposes a $300 fine against a defendant for jaywalking,217 and it turns 
out that the fine would be ruinous for the defendant, a court should find that the 
fine is grossly disproportional to the crime in light of the defendant’s personal 
circumstances. 
                                                                                                                     
 208 See Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 67, at 3. 
 209 See, e.g., id. at 4. 
 210 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5E1.2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2018). 
 211 See, e.g., Caliste v. Cantrell, 329 F. Supp. 3d 296, 312 (E.D. La. 2018) (“To satisfy 
the Due Process principles articulated by Supreme Court precedent, [a judge] must conduct 
an inquiry into criminal defendants’ ability to pay prior to pretrial detention.”).  
 212 See, e.g., United States v. J. B. Williams Co., 498 F.2d 414, 438 (2d Cir. 1974) 
(noting that in the context of a challenge to a penalties award for violations of the Federal 
Trade Act, “[a]s the court below recognized, the size of the penalty should be based on a 
number of factors including the good or bad faith of the defendants, the injury to the public, 
and the defendants’ ability to pay”).  
 213 See, e.g., Mathews v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 110 T.C.M. (RIA) 483 (T.C. 
2015) (noting that I.R.S. regulations set forth the relevant considerations for determining 
ability to pay). 
 214 Shales v. Gen. Chauffeurs, Sales Drivers & Helpers Local Union No. 330, 557 F.3d 
746, 749 (7th Cir. 2009) (“A district judge therefore should take the sanctioned party’s 
resources into account when setting the amount of a Rule 11 sanction.”). 
 215 See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998) (“The touchstone of the 
constitutional inquiry under the Excessive Fines Clause is the principle of proportionality.”). 
 216 Alec Schierenbeck, The Constitutionality of Income-Based Fines, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1869, 1896 (2018).  
 217 This is not outside the range of possibilities, as this is an example of a fine that DOJ 
found was imposed in Ferguson. See FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 21, at 52. 
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Taken together, these arguments paint a compelling picture for why courts 
should take stock of a defendant’s economic circumstances when deciding 
whether a fine is constitutionally excessive.218  
B. Whether Fines and Forfeitures Are a Significant Source of Revenue 
in the Sentencing Jurisdiction 
The second factor courts should consider when conducting an Excessive 
Fine Clause analysis is whether the imposing jurisdiction uses fines and 
forfeitures as a significant revenue source. Consideration of this factor helps 
guarantee that fines and forfeitures serve a legitimate penal purpose and guards 
against state and local governments abusing their power, which is especially 
important considering how widely fines and forfeitures are used today. 
In Harmelin v. Michigan,219 Justice Scalia cogently explained why courts 
need to carefully review the imposition of financial punishment: “[F]ines are a 
source of revenue . . . it makes sense to scrutinize governmental action more 
closely when the State stands to benefit.”220 Justice Scalia elaborated that when 
a jurisdiction stands to benefit from a punishment, as is the case with fines, there 
is a much greater risk that it “will be imposed in a measure out of accord with 
the penal goals of retribution and deterrence.”221 This is different from 
incarceration and even capital punishment, because those forms of punishment 
“cost a State money.”222 And as the Supreme Court recognized in Timbs, the 
concern that fines or forfeitures will be imposed for non-penological purposes 
“is scarcely hypothetical”223—“because they are politically easier to impose 
                                                                                                                     
 218 Courts around the country have held that money bail systems that don’t take into 
account a defendant’s ability to pay are unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
See O’Donnell v. Harris Cty., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1052 (S.D. Tex. 2017), aff’d as 
modified, 882 F.3d 528 (5th Cir. 2018), aff’d as modified sub nom., 892 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 
2018); Buffin v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, No. 15-CV-04959-YGR, 2018 WL 424362, 
at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2018); Schultz v. State, 330 F. Supp. 3d 1344, 1348 (N.D. Ala. 
2018); Pierce v. City of Velda City, No. 4:15-cv-570, 2015 WL 10013006, at *1 (E.D. Mo. 
June 3, 2015). 
 219 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991). Harmelin involved an Eighth 
Amendment challenge to a mandatory life without parole sentence for cocaine possession. 
Id. at 961–62. One of the arguments Harmelin made was that the sentence was “significantly 
disproportionate” to his crime. Id. at 961. The Supreme Court rejected the argument and 
affirmed his sentence. Id. at 996. 
 220 Id. at 978 n.9. Indeed, Justice Scalia noted that the Court had at least twice before 
observed that governmental action must be more closely scrutinized when the government 
stands to financially benefit. See id. (citing U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 
25–26 (1977); Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 350–51 (1935)). 
 221 Id. The Supreme Court has also recognized that “[r]eformation and rehabilitation of 
offenders [are] important goals of criminal jurisprudence.” Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 
241, 248 (1949). The Court has additionally said that “incapacitation [is] a legitimate 
penological goal.” See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 72 (2010).  
 222 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 979 n.9.  
 223 Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 689 (2019). 
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than generally applicable taxes, state and local governments nationwide 
increasingly depend heavily on fines and forfeitures as a source of revenue.”224 
Indeed, some states collect hundreds of millions of dollars in fines a year,225 and 
for some localities, fines revenue comprises over ninety percent of the local 
budget.226 
The well-documented horror stories of jurisdictions (ab)using fines to raise 
revenue often feature municipal courts.227 Certainly, the incentives for 
municipal courts to impose exorbitant fines is visceral. But the problems are not 
limited to municipal courts. State courts too have a financial incentive to impose 
fines as much as possible.228  
The Bureau of Justice Statistics reported that “[a]t least 50% of trial courts 
received their primary funding . . . from state funding sources.”229 And 
according to the Council of State Governments, “two-thirds of the state court 
systems receive funding primarily from the state” and twenty percent are at least 
partially funded by the state, while only twenty percent of courts are funded 
primarily from local sources.230 The data shows that fines are financially 
important to state-funded court systems—over twenty states reported to the 
                                                                                                                     
 224 Id. (quoting Brief of American Civil Liberties Union, supra note 187, at 7).  
 225 As the ACLU noted in its brief, states such as New Jersey and Arizona collected 
hundreds of millions of dollars in a single year in fines and fees alone from their municipal 
courts. See id. (citing N.J. COURTS, REPORT OF THE SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE ON 
MUNICIPAL COURT OPERATIONS, FINES, AND FEES 12 (June 2018), https://www.njcourts 
.gov/courts/assets/supreme/reports/2018/sccmcoreport.pdf  [https://perma.cc/BB36-
GFH4]; MARK FLATTEN, GOLDWATER INST., CITY COURT: MONEY, PRESSURE AND POLITICS 
MAKE IT TOUGH TO BEAT THE RAP 6–7 (Sept. 2017), https://goldwaterinstitute.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/09/City-Court-Policy-Paper-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/3PGY-C4X8]). 
And “[a]mong the 100 cities in the United States that generated the highest proportion of 
municipal revenue from fines and fees in 2012, between 7.2% and 30.4% of total municipal 
revenue was derived from fine and fee collection.” Id. (citing Dan Kopf, The Overlooked 
Reason Why Some Cities Have Strained Relationships with Cops, BUS. INSIDER (July 11, 
2016), https://www.businessinsider.com/reason-for-strained-relationship-with-police-2016-
7 [https://perma.cc/KBE5-SBCP]).  
 226 See, e.g., supra note 40 and accompanying text.  
 227 See FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 21, at 42; Brief of American Civil Liberties 
Union, supra note 187, at 4.  
 228 MICHAEL D. GREENBERG & SAMANTHA CHERNEY, DISCOUNT JUSTICE: STATE COURT 
BELT-TIGHTENING IN AN ERA OF FISCAL AUSTERITY 5 (2017), https://www.rand.org/ 
content/dam/rand/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF300/CF343/RAND_CF343.pdf  [https:// 
perma.cc/2NPJ-SNSZ]. 
 229 RON MALEGA & THOMAS H. COHEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE COURT 
ORGANIZATION, 2011, 8 (Nov. 2013), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/sco11.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5NYE-TWF7]. 
 230 See Daniel J. Hall, Funding Justice, 60 CAPITOL IDEAS, 26, 26 (Mar.–Apr. 2017), 
https://www.csg.org/pubs/capitolideas/2017_mar_apr/images/CI_Mar_Apr_2017_Web
site.pdf [https://perma.cc/NZ5T-XURC]. 
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National Center for State Courts that fines are a revenue source for their 
judiciaries,231 and most of those jurisdictions do not have municipal courts.232  
In light of this, courts must scrutinize fines and forfeitures—imposed by all 
levels of court—to ensure they are being imposed for a legitimate penal reason 
and that their primary purpose is not to raise revenue. Because, as the Supreme 
Court has made clear in the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause context, a 
punishment that goes beyond its penal purpose is constitutionally excessive. 
As Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, said relatively recently, for a 
punishment to be constitutional, it must have a legitimate “rationale,” whether 
it be “deterrence, incapacitation, retribution, or rehabilitation.”233 Justice White 
made this same point decades earlier, asserting a penalty that exceeds its 
penological purpose is “patently excessive.”234 Justices Stewart, Powell, and 
Stevens made the same point in yet another case, averring that a punishment that 
is untethered to a “penological justification . . . results in the gratuitous 
infliction of suffering.”235 In fact, in the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause 
context, it is uncontroverted that punishment is constitutionally “excessive if it 
                                                                                                                     
 231 Funds Dedicated to the Judicial Branch: Sources of Revenue and Retention of 
Dedicated Funds, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., http://data.ncsc.org/QvAJAXZfc/open 
doc.htm?document=Public%20App/SCO.qvw&host=QVS@qlikviewisa&anonymous
=true&bookmark=Document\BM16 [https://perma.cc/958F-6FBG]. 
 232 For example, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Maryland, New Hampshire, and 
Vermont all reported fines as a revenue source, and none of the states have municipal courts. 
See id. (listing the states that self-reported using fines as a revenue source); State Court 
Structure Charts, CT. STAT. PROJECT, http://www.courtstatistics.org/Other-Pages/ 
State_Court_Structure_Charts.aspx [https://perma.cc/STE3-CQTA] (providing an 
interactive map of every state’s court structure). 
 233 See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2767 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The 
rationale for capital punishment, as for any punishment, classically rests upon society’s need 
to secure deterrence, incapacitation, retribution, or rehabilitation.”). Glossip involved a claim 
that the drug protocol used by Oklahoma risked severe pain in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. See id. at 2731. 
 234 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 312 (1972) (White, J., concurring) (“A penalty 
with such negligible returns to the State would be patently excessive and cruel and unusual 
punishment violative of the Eighth Amendment.”). Furman involved claims that the death 
sentences in one murder case and two rape cases were cruel and unusual punishment in 
violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 239 (per curiam). The Court found that these 
sentences were unconstitutional. Id. Furman was responsible for a de facto moratorium on 
the death penalty. See Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, Capital Punishment and the 
Eighth Amendment: Furman and Gregg in Retrospect, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 927, 944 
(1985) (“Furman was interpreted as having said that capital punishment had been abolished 
in America.” (quotation marks omitted)).  
 235 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182–83 (1976) (“Although we cannot invalidate a 
category of penalties because we deem less severe penalties adequate to serve the ends of 
penology, the sanction imposed cannot be so totally without penological justification that it 
results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering.” (brackets and internal citation omitted)). 
Gregg ended the de facto moratorium on the death penalty established by Furman. See 
Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 234, at 944 (“[W]hen the Supreme Court announced its 
decision in Gregg v. Georgia it became clear that executions would indeed be resumed.”).  
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goes beyond what is necessary to achieve the legitimate penological goals of 
punishment.”236  
As Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court in Graham v. Florida, “The 
penological justifications for [a] sentencing practice are also relevant to [an 
Eighth Amendment] analysis.”237 Thus, the same principle that the Court has 
applied in its Cruel and Unusual Punishment cases—that punishment is per se 
excessive if it goes beyond what’s necessary to serve a legitimate penal 
purpose—should apply to Excessive Fines Clause cases. Because as Graham 
said, a sentence “lacking any legitimate penological justification is by its nature 
disproportionate to the offense.”238  
Additionally, as Justice Scalia explained in Harmelin and the Court 
recognized in Timbs, inquiry as to whether a punishment has a legitimate 
purpose is even more pressing in the Excessive Fines Clause context because 
there is a financial incentive for courts to impose fines and forfeitures without a 
legitimate penological purpose, which does not exist in the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause context.239 Given the incentives at play, it is more likely 
that a fine or forfeiture will be divorced from a legitimate penological purpose 
because jurisdictions stand to profit. Put differently, jurisdictions may fine more 
than is penologically necessary as a way to raise revenue. Courts should 
therefore scrutinize the reasons why fines are being imposed given that “the 
primary focus of the Eighth Amendment was the potential for governmental 
abuse of its ‘prosecutorial’ power.”240  
Thus, consistent with established Eighth Amendment tenets, when 
presented with a claim that financial punishment is constitutionally excessive, 
courts should carefully consider how the jurisdiction in question uses fines and 
forfeitures to unearth the possibility that the fine or forfeiture was not truly 
imposed to punish, but was instead intended to fill the local piggybank. 
C. Whether Other Jurisdictions Impose Similar Fines for Similar 
Crimes  
In addition to considering whether the sentencing jurisdiction uses fines as 
a significant revenue source, courts should also consider whether other 
jurisdictions impose similar fines and forfeitures for similar crimes.241 This 
                                                                                                                     
 236 Ian P. Farrell, Strict Scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
853, 904 (2013). 
 237 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 71 (2010). Graham presented the question of 
whether the Eighth Amendment permits a juvenile to be sentenced to life without parole for 
a non-homicide crime. Id. at 52–53. The Court held that it does not. Id. at 82.  
 238 Id. at 71. 
 239 See Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 689 (2019); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 
957, 978 n.9 (1991). 
 240 Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 265–66 (1989). 
 241 Professor Margaret Cordray advocates for the consideration of this factor when 
determining whether a contempt sanction is constitutionally excessive. See Margaret 
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inquiry helps guarantee proportionality across the country. It also would help 
root out any arbitrariness in the imposition of financial punishment, further 
ensuring fines are being imposed for legitimate penal reasons and not for 
financial gain.  
In the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause context, to ensure punishment 
does not violate the Eighth Amendment’s proportionality principle, the Supreme 
Court has said that it is appropriate to compare the punishment received by the 
defendant with the punishments received by defendants in other jurisdictions for 
similar crimes.242 Specifically, in Solem v. Helm, the Court said that when 
determining whether a punishment is constitutionally excessive, lower “courts 
may find it useful to compare the sentences imposed for commission of the same 
crime in other jurisdictions.”243 If other jurisdictions do not impose the same 
level of punishment for the same type of crime, that is an indication that the 
punishment may be constitutionally excessive.244  
It would not be a stretch for courts to consider this factor when conducting 
an Excessive Fines Clause analysis because Solem v. Helm is a case from which 
Bajakajian derived the “grossly disproportional” standard.245 And the Court in 
Solem clearly believed that comparing how the same crimes are punished in 
different jurisdictions was relevant to whether a punishment is grossly 
disproportional.246 In fact, following Solem, at least two state supreme courts 
                                                                                                                     
Meriwether Cordray, Contempt Sanctions and the Excessive Fines Clause, 76 N.C. L. REV. 
407, 460 (1998) (explaining that “it would be useful for courts to compare the coercive fine 
at issue with coercive sanctions threatened or imposed in similar cases”). Professor Cordray 
believes that “[t]his kind of comparative analysis should prove useful in the coercive 
contempt setting, because the judge generally has no statutory limit set on his or her 
sanctioning authority. In this unique context, the comparative analysis can serve as an 
important means of ferreting out a coercive contempt fine that reflects the distorting effects 
of an individual judge’s overreaction or bias.” Id. at 461.  
 242 See, e.g., Graham, 560 U.S. at 60; Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 291 (1983).  
 243 Solem, 463 U.S. at 291. Solem presented the issue of “whether the Eighth 
Amendment proscribes a life sentence without possibility of parole for a seventh nonviolent 
felony.” Id. at 279. The Court held that Helm’s sentence was “significantly disproportionate 
to his crime,” and therefore was “prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 303. In 
Graham, the Supreme Court clarified that only after there is “an inference of gross 
disproportionately” should a court “compare the defendant’s sentence with the sentences 
received by other offenders in the same jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the 
same crime in other jurisdictions.” 560 U.S. at 60 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 
957, 1005 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The 
Graham Court continued, “[i]f this comparative analysis validates an initial judgment that 
the sentence is grossly disproportionate, the sentence is cruel and unusual.” Id. (internal 
quotation marks and brackets omitted).  
 244 See Solem, 463 U.S. at 291–92 (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 791–92 
(1982); Coker v. Georgia, 434 U.S. 584, 593–97 (1977); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 
349, 380 (1910)). 
 245 United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 336 (1998).  
 246 Solem, 463 U.S. at 303 (holding that Helm’s life without parole sentence was 
unconstitutional in part because he had “been treated more harshly than he would have been 
in any other jurisdiction, with the possible exception of a single State”).  
102 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 81:1 
already consider this factor when conducting an Excessive Fines Clause 
analysis.247 
Moreover, considering how other jurisdictions punish similar crimes goes 
together with the consideration of whether the imposing jurisdiction relies on 
fines as a significant source of revenue. If the imposing jurisdiction is one of the 
few in the country that imposes a hefty fine for a petty crime (for example, 
jaywalking), then there is reason to believe that the fine is not being imposed 
for a legitimate penological reason. This inference grows even stronger if that 
jurisdiction relies heavily on fines for revenue.  
Finally, considering what other jurisdictions do ensures uniformity. If one 
jurisdiction is wildly out of step with another, that will be accounted for and 
checked by this factor. For example, in Ferguson, DOJ “found instances in 
which the court charged $302 for a single Manner of Walking violation; $427 
for a single Peace Disturbance violation; $531 for High Grass and Weeds; $777 
for Resisting Arrest; and $792 for Failure to Obey, and $527 for Failure to 
Comply.”248 If few jurisdictions imposed similarly exorbitant fines for such 
minor offenses, then that would be an indication that these fines were 
constitutionally excessive. This factor helps guarantee that the Eighth 
Amendment’s protections will apply equally across the country, instead of 
varying from state to state or county to county. 
In light of the fact that a case from which the Supreme Court explicitly 
derived the Excessive Fines Clause “grossly disproportional” test directly 
admonishes courts to compare the punishment in question to punishments 
imposed by other jurisdictions under similar circumstances, courts should 
perform a similar survey when deciding whether a fine is constitutionally 
excessive. 
                                                                                                                     
 247 See, e.g., Wilson v. Comm’r of Revenue, 656 N.W.2d 547, 556 (Minn. 2003) (“The 
third Solem factor invites us to compare the personal assessment with fines imposed for the 
commission of the same offense in other jurisdictions.”); State v. Real Prop. at 633 E. 640 
N., 994 P.2d 1254, 1259 (Utah 2000) (noting that for an Excessive Fines Clause analysis, 
one factor courts must consider is “the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime 
in other jurisdictions”). In her dissent in Browning-Ferris, Justice O’Connor, joined by 
Justice Stevens, explained that under the Solem v. Helm framework, when conducting an 
Excessive Fines Clause analysis, courts “should compare the civil and criminal penalties 
imposed in the same jurisdiction for different types of conduct, and the civil and criminal 
penalties imposed by different jurisdictions for the same or similar conduct.” Browning-
Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 301 (1898) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
The majority did not opine on this one way or another because it held that the civil jury award 
in question was not covered by the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against excessive fines. 
Id. at 260 (majority opinion). 
 248 FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 21, at 52. 
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D. Whether the Sentencing Jurisdiction Disproportionately Imposes 
Fines Against Minority Defendants  
The final factor courts should consider when conducting an Excessive Fines 
Clause analysis is whether the jurisdiction has a history of disparately imposing 
fines or forfeitures against minorities. The consideration of this factor is 
appropriate because it accords with the history and purpose of the Fourteenth 
Amendment—the Amendment that incorporates the Excessive Fines Clause 
against the states. 
When holding the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 
incorporates the Excessive Fines Clause against the states, the Court in Timbs 
made sure to discuss the history surrounding the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
ratification.249 For the Court, this history shed light on which provisions of the 
Bill of Rights the Framers intended to enforce against the states.250 A review of 
this history leaves no doubt that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Framers intended 
for the Excessive Fines Clause to be incorporated against the states. One reason: 
to protect against the widespread abuse of formerly enslaved Black people. 
One of the animating purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment was to 
“protect the rights of the former slaves.”251 While debating the Fourteenth 
Amendment, members of Congress repeatedly highlighted the concern of states 
using punishment to suppress Black people with no federal recourse. For 
example, Representative John Bingham—“The Father” of the Fourteenth 
Amendment252—said when closing the debates: “[C]ruel and unusual 
punishments have been inflicted under State laws within this Union upon 
citizens, not only for crimes committed, but for sacred duty done, for which and 
against which the Government of the United States had provided no remedy and 
could provide none.”253  
The concerns of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Framers about states 
imposing unjust punishment against Black people did not turn on what form the 
punishment took. In other words, the Framers did not exalt the Eighth 
Amendment’s protection against “cruel and unusual punishments” over its 
protections against “excessive bail” or “excessive fines.”254 Instead, the Framers 
believed that all unjust punishment—especially punishment targeted at 
subordinating Black people—was abhorrent. Bingham did not mince words on 
this point, declaring “[i]t was an opprobrium to the Republic that for fidelity to 
                                                                                                                     
 249 See Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 688–89 (2019). 
 250 See generally id.  
 251 Paul Finkelman, This Historical Context of the Fourteenth Amendment, 13 TEMP. 
POL. & C.R. L. REV. 389, 401 (2004). 
 252 Gerard N. Magliocca, The Father of the 14th Amendment, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR 
(Sept. 17, 2003), https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/17/the-father-of-the-
14th-amendment/ [https://perma.cc/PU5U-VA37]. 
 253 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866) (statement of Rep. John Bingham) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 254 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
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the United States [citizens] could not by national law be protected against the 
degrading punishment inflicted on slaves and felons by State law.”255 The 
Fourteenth Amendment repaired this injustice by “strik[ing] down those State 
rights and invest[ing] all power in the General Government.”256 The 
Amendment would prohibit all “practices that reduce groups to the position of 
a lower or disfavored caste.”257 
To be sure, financial punishment was a critical tool that white Southerners 
used to subordinate Black people. “Southern States enacted Black Codes to 
subjugate newly freed slaves and maintain the prewar racial hierarchy.”258 As 
the Supreme Court highlighted in Timbs, these laws included “draconian fines 
for violating broad proscriptions on ‘vagrancy’ and other dubious offenses.”259 
Then, when a formerly enslaved Black person could not pay the fine, “[s]tates 
often demanded involuntary labor instead.”260 Thus, southern states used fines, 
and formerly enslaved Black people’s inability to pay them, to create a “new 
system of forced labor,” reducing Black people “to a status somewhere between 
that of slaves (which they no longer were) and full free people (which most 
white Southerners opposed).”261 Debates over the Fourteenth Amendment 
“repeatedly mentioned the use of fines to coerce involuntary labor.”262 
If one of the reasons the Court held the Excessive Fines Clause applies to 
the states is a history of concern that states would wield financial punishment to 
subordinate Black people, then that concern should feature in an Excessive 
Fines Clause analysis. A jurisdiction disproportionately imposing “draconian 
fines” for “dubious offenses” against Black people (or other minorities)—like 
those seen in Ferguson—is a chief evil that the Framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment wanted to protect against. The Framers guarded against this evil by 
intending to incorporate the Excessive Fines Clause against the states.263 
                                                                                                                     
 255 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2543 (1866) (statement of Rep. John Bingham) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 256 Id. at 2500 (statement of Rep. George Shanklin). 
 257 Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: 
Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 9–10, 10 n.5 (2003). 
 258 Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 688 (2019); see also WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 43 (1995) 
(southern states passed “the infamous black codes, which imposed a second-class status just 
short of slavery on blacks”); Douglas L. Colbert, Liberating the Thirteenth Amendment, 30 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 55 n.62 (1995) (“The Black Codes represented a legalized form 
of slavery in which each southern state perpetuated the master-slave relationship by passing 
apprenticeship laws, labor contract laws, vagrancy laws and restrictive travel 
laws . . . denying African Americans civil rights and due process of law.”).  
 259 Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 688.  
 260 Id. at 689. 
 261 Paul Finkelman, John Bingham and the Background to the Fourteenth Amendment, 
36 AKRON L. REV. 671, 685 (2003). 
 262 Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 689 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 443 (1886)). 
 263 The Fourteenth Amendment had a clear purpose: “to enforce the Bill of Rights.” See 
Representative John A. Bingham, Speech in Support of the Proposed Amendment to Enforce 
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Therefore, whether a jurisdiction discriminatorily imposes fines against 
minorities should be a key factor that courts consider when deciding whether a 
fine is constitutionally excessive.  
Accounting for whether a jurisdiction has a history of discriminatorily 
imposing financial punishment takes on special importance today because fines 
and forfeitures are disproportionately levied against people of color.264 The 
stark racial disparities should give courts pause, especially when considering the 
collateral consequences that attend financial punishment.265 The Ferguson 
Report “highlighted the way that police practices and routine courtroom 
procedures led African Americans to face higher fines, more warrants for failing 
to pay criminal justice debt, and greater exposure to the criminal justice 
system.”266 Essentially, Ferguson’s fining practices led to the widespread 
subordination of the city’s Black residents.  
Given that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Framers were particularly 
concerned with local and state governments using financial punishment as a 
means to relegate Black people to second-class citizens, consistent with the 
intent of the Framers, courts should consider any racial disparities in the 
imposition of financial punishment when deciding whether a fine or forfeiture 
is constitutionally excessive. 
E. Applying the Four Factors 
The four factors are designed to work together. As the Supreme Court said 
in Solem v. Helm—again, a case from which the Court borrowed the “grossly 
disproportional” standard—“no single criterion can identify when a sentence is 
so disproportionate that it violates the Eighth Amendment.”267 The factors 
inform each other. For example, if there is evidence that a jurisdiction relies 
heavily on fines as a source of revenue, that evidence undermines the 
presumption of legitimacy attached to the punishment and instead weighs in 
favor of the punishment being constitutionally suspect. The more financial 
importance fines have in a jurisdiction, the less likely it is that the jurisdiction 
                                                                                                                     
the Bill of Rights 1 (Feb. 28, 1866) (transcript available at https://archive 
.org/stream/onecountryonecon00bing#page/n1 [https://perma.cc/RUY2-VGUG]). 
 264 See, e.g., Leonard v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 847, 848 (2017) (Thomas, J., respecting the 
denial of certiorari) (noting that forfeiture regimes “frequently target the poor and other 
groups least able to defend their interests in forfeiture proceedings”); Colgan, Lessons from 
Ferguson, supra note 17, at 1175 (explaining that “fines were collected at rates more than 
fifteen times higher in one low-income, majority-black community than in a more affluent 
neighboring municipality”); Louis S. Rulli, Seizing Family Homes from the Innocent: Can 
the Eighth Amendment Protect Minorities and the Poor from Excessive Punishment in Civil 
Forfeiture?, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1111, 1141 (2017) (collecting “an array of analyses 
conducted by media outlets and advocacy organizations [that] suggest[] that people of color 
are disproportionately impacted by civil asset forfeiture”).  
 265 See supra pp. 73–77.  
 266 CONFRONTING CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT, supra note 18, at 2. 
 267 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 n.17 (1983).  
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is imposing fines for legitimate penological reasons. Likewise, comparing how 
other jurisdictions punish similar crimes is not to say that if two jurisdictions 
fine differently, punishment imposed in the jurisdiction with the higher fines is 
unconstitutional. It just means that the reviewing court should again consider 
this disparity when deciding whether the fine in question is constitutionally 
excessive; if a jurisdiction is out of step with the rest of the country, then the 
answer leans towards yes. And if minorities are being disproportionately 
punished, that suggests at best an arbitrariness in the imposition of fines, and at 
worst, outright discrimination.268 A court should therefore take stock of racial 
disparities in the imposition of punishment when deciding whether a fine or 
forfeiture is unconstitutional. 
It is important to acknowledge some of the limitations of the proposed 
factors. One is that some of the factors will be less illuminating in certain 
contexts. For example, if a jurisdiction is majority Black, racial disparities may 
not be as relevant when deciding whether there has been a constitutional 
violation. Likewise, there may be anchoring issues—fines may be set too high 
across the board, thus comparing fines in different jurisdictions may not reveal 
much.269 It is also important to acknowledge that some factors require robust 
data collection—for example, to compare fines across jurisdictions or to 
                                                                                                                     
 268 The Supreme Court has held, in the context of the death penalty and the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause, that racial disparities alone are not enough to prove an Eighth 
Amendment violation. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 313 (1987) (rejecting an 
Eighth Amendment challenge to a death sentence despite being presented with a “complex 
statistical study that indicates a risk that racial considerations enter into capital sentencing 
determinations”). The 5-4 decision has been derided by many as a stain on the Supreme 
Court. E.g., Annika Neklason, The ‘Death Penalty’s Dred Scott’ Lives On, ATLANTIC (June 
14, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/06/legacy-mccleskey-v-
kemp/591424/ [https://perma.cc/8PDD-F7U2]. However, that McCleskey was a Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause case means it is not binding in an Excessive Fines Clause 
context, and given the criticisms, it should not be extended, especially in light of the 
recognition by the Court that there are different concerns at play in the Excessive Fines 
Clause context. See supra p. 37. But even if McCleskey is held to apply in this context, 
because the proposed test is a multi-factored test, a constitutional violation does not rely on 
racial disparities alone and thus McCleskey should not be a barrier for relief. Moreover, the 
current Supreme Court has seemed particularly concerned with racism influencing the 
administration of justice. In just the past two years, the Supreme Court has found 
constitutional violations in cases where there was evidence of racial discrimination in jury 
deliberations, Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017); jury selection, Flowers v. 
Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, (2019); and when discriminatory race-based evidence was 
presented to a jury, Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759 (2017). The last example prompted Chief 
Justice Roberts to declare that “[o]ur law punishes people for what they do, not who they 
are.” Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 778. Therefore, if there is evidence that race influenced punishment, 
then that should be taken into account when conducting a constitutional analysis. 
 269 Scholars have written about issues with anchoring in sentencing, and how sentencing 
guidelines have normalized extreme prison sentences. See, e.g., Melissa Hamilton, Extreme 
Prison Sentences: Legal and Normative Consequences, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 59, 106 (2016). 
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examine racial disparities—and these factors cannot be fully operationalized 
until that data is collected.270  
That said, here is a sketch of what an analysis would look like using the 
proposed four factors. As an initial matter, Bajakajian cannot be ignored, so a 
court would consider the “essence” of the crime and the “harm” caused by the 
defendant when determining whether the fine or forfeiture is “grossly 
disproportional.”271 For this, a reviewing court can look to tests established by 
state and federal courts.272 Also following Bajakajian, the court would presume 
a fine or forfeiture within statutory guidelines is constitutional,273 although the 
ultimate question of whether a fine violates the Constitution is one that the 
reviewing court would have to consider de novo.274 It is here where the proposed 
factors kick in.  
First, the court would consider the defendant’s ability to pay, because while 
for some people a within-guidelines fine may be financially tolerable, another 
person may find that same fine ruinous. This would require the court to take full 
account of the defendant’s economic circumstances to ensure, in the words of 
Blackstone, that the fine is no larger than “his circumstances or personal estate 
will bear.”275 The National Center for State Courts recommends that judges 
consider a defendant’s income (if any); whether he receives public assistance; 
whether he has dependents; whether he has been recently incarcerated or 
homeless; whether he has any disabilities or mental health issues; and any other 
outstanding debts or financial obligations.276 If, after taking a holistic view of 
the defendant’s circumstances, a court finds that a defendant would be caused 
                                                                                                                     
 270 Some organizations, like the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law and 
the Arthur Liman Center for Public Interest at Yale Law School, have already begun doing 
extensive work collecting data on fines and fees practices across the country.  
 271 See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 337 (1998). 
 272 See supra pp. 86–88.  
 273 See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 336 (“[J]udgments about the appropriate punishment for 
an offense belong in the first instance to the legislature.”). 
 274 Id. at 336–37 n.10 (“The factual findings made by the district courts in conducting 
the excessiveness inquiry, of course, must be accepted unless clearly erroneous. But the 
question whether a fine is constitutionally excessive calls for the application of a 
constitutional standard to the facts of a particular case, and in this context de novo review of 
that question is appropriate.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 275 BLACKSTONE, supra note 201, at 372. 
 276 NAT’L TASK FORCE ON FINES, FEES, AND BAIL PRACTICES, supra note 71. Some 
scholars have explored a “day-fine model”—“an economic sanction mechanism used in 
several European and Latin American Countries.” See, e.g., Schierenbeck, supra note 216, 
at 1874–76; Beth A. Colgan, Graduating Economic Sanctions According to Ability to Pay, 
103 IOWA L. REV. 53, 56 (2017). This model involves a “two-step process”: First, offenses 
are assigned a penalty “that increase[s] with crime severity and [are] set without any 
consideration of a defendant’s ability to pay.” Id. at 56. Then, the court “establish[es] the 
defendant’s adjusted daily income, in which income was adjusted downward to account for 
personal and familial living expenses.” Id.  
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major hardship by a fine for a comparably minor crime, then that fine should be 
found excessive in violation of the Eighth Amendment.277 
Second, when considering whether fines are an important revenue source 
for the sentencing jurisdiction, the reviewing court should consider how courts 
in the sentencing jurisdiction are funded. This would include inquiring into 
whether fines are earmarked as a funding source for courts or their judges, 
whether the courts in that jurisdiction have experienced budgetary deficits, and 
whether local law enforcement are directed or expected to issue a certain number 
of citations over a given period. If fines are a significant source of revenue in 
the jurisdiction, the reviewing court should view the fines with skepticism. The 
reviewing court should also consider whether there have been increases in fines 
that cannot be explained by market factors such as inflation. If there have been, 
that suggests that the fines are not being set to fit the punishment, but instead 
are being set to satisfy budgetary needs. And at the point a fine is set above the 
amount necessary to serve a penological purpose, that fine should be found 
unconstitutional.  
Third, the reviewing court should compare the fine to fines imposed for 
similar crimes in other jurisdictions. And this comparison should not just be 
limited to surrounding jurisdictions. Courts should examine whether other 
jurisdictions across the country, especially those with different demographics 
and funding structures, impose similar fines. If they do not—for example, if few 
other jurisdictions are imposing $500 fines for overgrown grass, as was the case 
in Ferguson—that is a strong indication that the fine is excessive.278 
Finally, even if a fine accords with how similar crimes are punished in other 
places if, in the sentencing jurisdiction, fines are disproportionately imposed 
against minorities, the fine may still be constitutionally suspect. And in the face 
of such disparities, the government should be forced to provide a race-neutral 
reason for why it is that minorities are being disproportionately punished.279 If 
                                                                                                                     
 277 Scholars have criticized ability-to-pay inquiries because they are often inaccurate and 
require the court to make subjective judgments. See, e.g., Mary Fainsod Katzenstein & Mitali 
Nagrecha, A New Punishment Regime, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 555, 564 (2011). 
Other scholars have criticized ability-to-pay determinations as legitimizing an inherently 
discriminatory system. See, e.g., Theresa Zhen, (Color)blind Reform: How Ability-to-Pay 
Determinations Are Inadequate to Transform a Racialized System of Penal Debt, 43 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 175, 179 (2019). Both points are well taken. But as long as fines 
are on the books, the history of the Excessive Fines Clause compels the consideration of a 
defendant’s economic circumstances when assessing monetary punishment. And short of 
abolishing fines, there are (more) thoughtful ways for courts to perform ability-to-pay 
determinations. 
 278 For example, in the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause context, the Court found 
the life without parole sentence for the petitioner’s crime unconstitutional, in part because 
he had been “treated more harshly than he would have been in any other jurisdiction, with 
the possible exception of a single State.” Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983). 
 279 In other contexts, when faced with evidence of discrimination in the administration 
of justice, the Supreme Court has required the government to provide race neutral 
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a jurisdiction cannot provide a satisfactory explanation—for example, if 
Ferguson could not explain why “African Americans accounted for 95% of 
Manner of Walking in Roadway charges, and 94% of all Failure to Comply 
charges” when they comprise only sixty-seven percent of Ferguson’s 
population280—a court should find that race “was operating in the system in 
such a pervasive manner that it could be fairly said that system was irrational, 
arbitrary and capricious.”281 If that’s the case, the reviewing court should sustain 
any Eighth Amendment challenge. 
In the end, the four factors work to serve “the primary focus of the Eighth 
Amendment” by protecting against “the potential for governmental abuse of its 
prosecutorial power.”282 
V. CONCLUSION 
As fines and forfeitures continue to be imposed at astonishing rates, and so 
long as they are disparately imposed against poor people of color, courts must 
be wary of rubberstamping the constitutionality of this ubiquitous form of 
punishment. The proposed four factors—(1) whether a defendant is able to  
pay the fine; (2) whether fines are a significant source of revenue in the 
sentencing jurisdiction; (3) whether other jurisdictions impose similar fines for 
similar crimes; and (4) whether the sentencing jurisdiction disproportionately 
imposes fines against minority defendants—give courts a roadmap to ensuring 
financial punishment does not violate the Eighth Amendment. Hopefully they 
will follow it.  
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